Culture as a Moderator of Epistemically Suspect Beliefs

Abstract

A consistent finding reported in the literature is that epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., paranormal beliefs) are less frequently endorsed by individuals with a greater tendency to think analytically. However, these results have been observed predominantly in Western participants. In the present work, we explore various individual differences known to predict epistemically suspect beliefs across both Western and Eastern cultures. Across four studies with Japanese (n = 666) and Western (n = 650) individuals, we find that the association between thinking style and beliefs varied as a function of culture. Specifically, while Westerners who scored higher on measures of Type-2 analytic thinking tended to endorse epistemically suspect beliefs less, this association was not observed in Japanese samples, suggesting that the often-observed negative association between analytic thinking and epistemically suspect beliefs may be exclusive to Western individuals. Additionally, we demonstrate that a tendency to think holistically (specifically with regards to causality) is positively associated with the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs within both samples. Overall, we discuss how various individual differences predict the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs across cultures.

A framework for understanding reasoning errors: From fake news to climate change and beyond

“…These beliefs tend to be correlated (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012;Lobato et al, 2014) and they often share similar psychological antecedents (Čavojová et al, 2019;Erceg et al, 2019;Šrol, 2022). More importantly given the present topic, there are a large number of studies showing that intuitive people tend to hold more epistemically suspect beliefs in several cultures (e.g., Ballová Mikušková & Čavojová, 2020; Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015;Gervais, 2015;Majima, 2015;Pennycook, Cheyne, et al, 2012Pennycook, McPhetres, et al, 2021;Pennycook, Bago, et al, 2022;Shtulman & McCallum, 2014;Šrol, 2022;Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018;Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013;Swami et al, 2014;Toplak & Flora, 2021;van Elk, 2019;van Prooijen et al, 2022) (but see Majima et al, 2022). To simplify the summary of these findings, I will break these epistemically suspect beliefs into five categories that represent most (but not all) of the research on the topic relating to analytic thinking.…”

Popular epistemically unwarranted beliefs inventory (PEUBI): A psychometric instrument for assessing paranormal, pseudoscientific and conspiracy beliefs

“…1 These three types of EUB are progressively getting more attention from researchers and governments, probably due to the combination of their (1) high social prevalence and (2) negative implications. Regarding the first point, paranormal, pseudoscientific and conspiracy beliefs are common in the general population around the world (e.g., Höllinger & Smith, 2002; Imhoff et al, 2022; Majima et al, 2022), Spain being no exception (e.g., Díaz‐Vilela & Álvarez‐González, 2004; Imhoff et al, 2022; Torres et al, 2020). Regarding the second point, these three types of EUB are associated with negative outcomes such as interference with critical thinking, increased vulnerability to deception, rejection of science and objectivity, institutional distrust, decreased political and social engagement, social polarization and intolerance (e.g., increased prejudice, discrimination and intergroup violence), increased health risks (e.g., ignoring/rejecting health guidelines, opportunity costs of choosing ineffective treatments, iatrogeny) or failure to carry out constructive problem‐solving behaviors (Fasce, 2018; Irwin, 2009; Jolley et al, 2020; Stone et al, 2018).…”

“…1 1 In the context of paranormal, pseudoscientific and conspiracy beliefs, alternative nomenclatures to EUB have also been used, such as epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., Majima et al, 2022), scientifically unsubstantiated beliefs (e.g., Stone et al, 2018), scientifically unaccepted beliefs (e.g., Irwin & Marks, 2013), and contaminated mindware (e.g., Rizeq et al, 2020). …”

A validation of the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale and assessment of the cognitive correlates of pseudoscientific beliefs

“…Nevertheless, the predisposition to acquire scientific knowledge itself could be modulated by cognitive and meta-cognitive factors related to reasoning styles and analytic thinking. In relation to this, Fasce and Picó (2019) observed that the presence of pseudoscientific beliefs correlated with scores on the Rational-Experiential Information Styles selfreport questionnaire (Epstein, et al, 1996; see also Majima et al, 2022 for similar results with an abbreviated version of the scale). Specifically, endorsement of pseudoscience among Fasce and Picó's participants was positively correlated with scores on the faith in intuition subscale (i.e., the extent to which and individual relies on intuitive thinking), and negatively associated with scores on the need for cognition subscale (i.e., the individuals' level of enjoyment and engagement of rational, logical, and analytic thinking).…”

“…Among other factors, discrepancies between the results of these studies might be related to the use of self-report measures, which might not be the best tool to adequately capture reasoning strategies. In this sense, Fasce and Picó (2019; see also Majima et al, 2022) confirmed their results with regard to analytical thinking by means of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). Correct responses in this questionnaire have been assumed to indicate the ability to resist reporting intuitive answers ("System 1"-based responses in terms of Stanovich and West, 2000), and engage in reflective, effortful reasoning ("System 2"-based processes).…”