Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval

Carlin, Ryan E.; Love, Gregory J.; Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia

doi:10.1007/s11109-014-9267-3

Cited by 93 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The aggregate-level implications of these individual-level results are beyond the scope of this single-country analysis, although further study should explore whether economic voting is more common in countries with large informal economies. But the results presented here provide a mechanism that helps explain the high levels of economic voting in the region, evidenced by the economy's greater salience in Latin America than in established democracies and by economics trumping good governance in the minds of many voters (Singer 2011;Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colugna 2013;Carlin et al 2015). Economic accountability is not automatic, but depends on voter interest in the specific issue on which presidents are being judged.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…In particular, a large literature on Latin America shows that elections frequently turn on economic outcomes that occurred on the president's watch (see Gélineau and Singer 2015 for a review). Presidents in Latin America who oversee strong economies can even survive corruption scandals, as many citizens value economic opportunities more than good governance (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colugna 2013;Carlin et al 2015). Thus, economic volatility often brings Latin America electoral volatility as voters look for a leader who can generate economic progress (Roberts and Wibbels 1999;Queirolo 2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Informal Sector Work and Evaluations of the Incumbent: The Electoral Effect of Vulnerability on Economic Voting

Singer

2016

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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Economically vulnerable voters are expected to hold politicians accountable for their management of the economy because these voters are more likely to be personally affected by economic shocks and less able to cope with the resulting dislocation. Evidence from the informal sector in Argentina, where the lack of formal registration increases income volatility and denies unemployment benefits, is consistent with this hypothesis. Data from Argentina from 2005 to 2006 show that the association between evaluations of the economy and evaluations of President Néstor Kirchner was stronger among those working without formal employment guarantees. The implication is that the electoral support of Latin America's many informal workers may very well be fickle and dependent on economic performance.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Informal Sector Work and Evaluations of the Incumbent: The Electoral Effect of Vulnerability on Economic Voting

Singer

2016

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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“…While free, fair and periodic elections are thus expected to curb corruption, empirical tests of this expectation have produced inconclusive results (e.g., De Vries & Solaz, 2017;Fisman & Golden, 2017;Mares & Young, 2016). Some evidence suggests that corrupt activities take a considerable electoral toll on incumbents (e.g., Fackler & Lin, 1995;Ferraz & Finan, 2008;Klašnja, Tucker, & Deegan-Krause, 2016;Krause & Méndez, 2009;Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), while other work demonstrates that people often reelect politicians they know to be corrupt, not only in developing democracies (Carlin, Love, & Martinez-Gallardo, 2015a;Manzetti & Wilson, 2007;Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013) but also in more established ones (e.g., Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010;Reed, 1996;Rundquist, Strom, & Peters, 1977;Vivyan, Wagner, & Tarlov, 2012). This raises the question of why corruption often goes unpunished.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption

Solaz

Vries

Geus

2018

Comparative Political Studies

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This study suggests that in-group loyalty, defined as the degree to which people favor their own group over others, undermines the punishment of corruption. We present evidence from two studies. First, we utilize a real-world corruption scandal involving the ruling party in Spain that broke during survey fieldwork. People exposed to the scandal withhold support from the incumbent, but in-group loyalty based on partisanship weakens this effect. Second, we explore in-group loyalty beyond partisanship through laboratory experiments. These experiments artificially induce group identities, randomly assign the group identity of candidates and shut down any instrumental benefits of in-group loyalty. The experimental evidence suggests that people support corrupt candidates as long as they share a group identity and are willing to sacrifice material payoffs to do so. Our findings have important implications. Most importantly perhaps, they suggest that candidates can get away with corruption by engaging in identity politics.

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“…Conceptually, sus-tained and high popularity is not the only way popularity can deviate from the typical cyclical dynamic. As it turns out, although approval dynamics in Latin America look very similar on average to the pattern Mueller and others found for the U.S., recent research reveals a number of presidencies that buck this trend in a variety of ways (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015a;Carlin et al, 2018). In this special issue we describe and examine a handful of these outlier cases.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 56%

Introducción Número Especial: OUTLIERS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: DYNAMICS, LEVELS, AND RATES

Carlin¹,

Martínez-Gallardo²

2019

Rev. Lat. Op. Pub.

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Presidential approval tends to exhibit the dynamics of honeymoon, decline, and a rebound as elections near. But several presidential administrations and, indeed, some countries themselves, do not conform to this pattern. This introduction to the special issue identifies and classifies outliers to the typical dynamics of approval using a 12-category taxonomy and data on 140 presidential administrations in 18 Latin American countries from the Executive Approval Project 1.0. Contributors to this special issue use this taxonomy to select outlier cases to explain in their respective articles. This combination of cross-national and case-study approaches suggest a more general theory of presidential approval can be constructed by systematically testing new hypotheses generated in this special issue concerning the role of governing style, political communication, security, policy choice, and institutional context. 1 The authors are grateful to Mariano Torcal and the editorial board of RLOP for their encouragement and support of this special issue. We thank Peter Enns,

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Cushioning the Fall: Scandals, Economic Conditions, and Executive Approval

Cited by 93 publications

References 49 publications

Informal Sector Work and Evaluations of the Incumbent: The Electoral Effect of Vulnerability on Economic Voting

Informal Sector Work and Evaluations of the Incumbent: The Electoral Effect of Vulnerability on Economic Voting

In-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption

Introducción Número Especial: OUTLIERS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: DYNAMICS, LEVELS, AND RATES

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