Custom, Power and the Power of Rules

Byers, Michael

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491269

Cited by 470 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…1 Even though it is common to talk about voluntary international associations (such as the European Union or other treaty-based institutions) as challenges to or encroachments upon state sovereignty (Craig 2000, 41;Sassen 1996, 29), "intervention," as it is commonly understood, refers to the latter kind of challenge. That is, intervention is a prima facie violation of a state's sovereignty, though again paradoxically, such intervention can be a violation of state sovereignty and at the same time an act that affects its meaning (Byers 1999;Drumbl 2003, 409-431).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation – Edited by Matthias Krause

Post

2010

Governance

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation – Edited by Matthias Krause

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2010

Governance

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“…121 However, as Michael Byers correctly observes, "it normally takes time for State practice to accumulate in support of, or in opposition to, any particular rule". 122 Notwithstanding the fact that there is no stipulated period of time after which state practice would crystallize into custom, it usually takes many years for state practice to become customary international law. This is so even in cases where state practice is recognized as instant custom.…”

Section: Development By Conventional or Customary International Law?mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Universal Procedural Framework for War Crimes Tribunals

Okebukola

2012

Int Community Law Rev

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Notwithstanding the uniformity of war crimes substantive law, applicable procedural rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the case of ad hoc tribunals, the applicable rules may not be known until the tribunal is established. Consequently, there is uncertainty and incoherence in war crimes procedural law. Furthermore, the quality of applicable rules is dependent on the varying experience, knowledge and intentions of the framers of the procedural rules of each tribunal. This article makes the case for a universal procedural framework that can serve as an instrument for evaluating and creating war crimes procedural rules. Amongst other things, such a framework will bring about certainty and coherence in war crimes procedural law. In devising the model framework, the article adopts the Benthamite approach to the relationship between substantive law and procedural law and also relies on some aspects of the process evaluation theories of Robert Summers and Michael Bayles.

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“…Major powers continue to use armed force absent explicit Security Council authorization, and their arguments continue to reflect fundamental areas of disagreement 6 . Second, in the absence of a general trend, even if we were to accept that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new international order characterized by the end of superpower rivalry and a greater emphasis on international law (Falk 1995:626–628; Byers 1999:42), why was such process of internalization not occurring throughout the Cold War? If states have deeply internalized Charter rules, it would seem that at least some of them would have done so before the end of the Cold War, yet the literature is nearly void of such cases, focusing instead on cases that occurred after the end of the Cold War (see inter alia Caron 1993:553–554; Johnstone 2003:459–475).…”

Section: Collective Legitimation Within the Un Charter Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of International Order: A Re-examination of the UN Charter System1

Westra

2010

International Studies Quarterly

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Much of the existing literature has accorded the Security Council with collective authority to confer legitimacy on actions involving the use of armed force. However, because of the veto, scholars have been able to point to relatively few instances in which the Charter has functioned thusly to legitimate or to restrain the actions of powerful states. This article provides an alternative conceptualization, treating the Charter as the basis of a broader system of international order in which legitimacy is conferred cumulatively, by both states within the Security Council and those outside of it, based on the extent of actions’ congruence with Charter rules that serve states’ shared interests. States’ expressions of acceptance confer legitimacy, while their expressions (and acts) of resistance withhold legitimacy, evoking prudential restraint from major powers attempting to signal their continuing commitment to the existing, postwar international order. The article applies this conceptualization to a case study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

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Custom, Power and the Power of Rules

Abstract: By accepting some rules of customary international law states are necessarily accepting rules about how those rules are maintained, developed or changed.

Cited by 470 publications

References 0 publications

The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation – Edited by Matthias Krause

The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation – Edited by Matthias Krause

A Universal Procedural Framework for War Crimes Tribunals

Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of International Order: A Re-examination of the UN Charter System1

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