Cyber-Attack Detection and Countermeasure for Distributed Electric Springs for Smart Grid Applications

Abstract

With increasing installations of grid-connected power electronic converters in the distribution network, there is a new trend of using distributed control in a cyber layer to coordinate the operations of these power converters for improving power system stability. However, cyber-attacks remain a threat to such distributed control. This paper addresses the cyber-attack detection and a countermeasure of distributed electric springs (ESs) that have emerged as a fast demand-response technology. A fully distributed model-based architecture for cyber-attack detection in the communication network is developed. Based on a dynamic model of ES with consensus control, a local state estimator is proposed and practically implemented to monitor the system. The estimator is fully distributed because only local and neighboring information is necessary. A countermeasure for the distributed ESs to ride through the cyber-attack and maintain regulatory services in a microgrid is demonstrated successfully. Experimental results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed cyber-attack detection method and its ride-through capability. INDEXTERMS Electric springs, cyber-attack detection, distributed state estimator.

Adaptive distributed demand side management with weighted dimension reduction for energy resource management in smart grid

“…It has dealt with the issue from the perspective of network protection [33] Reduce the dimension of data in the PMU system via PCA [34] DR modelling via PCA DR Central: Expensive and highly vulnerable-Cannot auto-adapt [5] Distributed fusion Distributed DR by randomized ADMM DR Neglect to investigate the determinants of DR behaviour; Ignored the reduction of the computational dimensions-The method is fully distributed and cannot adjust the cyber security of the power system. It is relatively slow [6] Managing residential DR via ADMM DR [9] Fully distributed optimal operation by considering the uncertainty of DR OPF_DR [10] Distributed DR management DR [11] Distributed state estimator by Kalman filter Control-DR Despite providing a method to deal with cyber-attacks, it has not provided a preventive method [12] Blockchain-based transactive energy management (TEM) system DR-IOT It has dealt with the issue from the perspective of telecommunications and information technology [13] Distribution automation strategies Review [14][15][16][17][18][19] Consensus theory and distributed control method, Lagrangian-based approach and distributed optimization by multi agents EPD Slows down in a large-scale system; Determining the minimum number of agents to ensure the cyber security of the system is not discussed. Neglect the DR [21] Distributed optimization by AHADMM Neglect the DR-Ignored the reduction of computational dimensions [20,[26][27][28][29] Distributed optimization by ADMM Slows down in a large-scale system-The control parameters are fixed and lack adaptability, and the DR not considered [22] Distributed optimization over time-varying directed graphs by DGDM…”

“…That is, from the point of view of the structure of calculations for the management of energy resources and DR, the centralized method is mostly used [7,8], or fully distributed computing methods are used [9,10]. Smart grid cyber-security cannot be provided by the fully distributed methods [11]. In addition, the computation method in distributed methods is usually swept step by step (node by node) for the whole system, and if computation parallelization methods are used in all nodes, the processing greatly increases [12].…”

A brief review on hardware structure of AC electric spring

“…To overcome this the concept of the switchable smart load was introduced [21] using indirect voltage control. The electric spring does not require, a communication network but with use of a communication network with ES can drastically reduce the power instability [22]. In microgrids for unplanned islanding operations, ES stabilizes the voltage across critical loads [23].…”