Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Abstract

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with 'bolting on' security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control

“…For instance, the design and construction of an advanced reactor will likely have a very long timeline and involve multiple organizations, while a simple modification at a research reactor may occur relatively quickly and include only a small group of people. As an applied integrated energy system example, the CIE approach was used during the high-level design of a hydrogen generation project in which heat and electricity were provided by an interconnected NPP [35]. The use of a multi-disciplinary team to address system of system interdependencies through a structured risk analysis process resulted in new insights into the potential for both adversarial and unintentional cyber risks.…”

“…The use of a multi-disciplinary team to address system of system interdependencies through a structured risk analysis process resulted in new insights into the potential for both adversarial and unintentional cyber risks. As a result, the system was immediately redesigned to eliminate specific identified risk as well as to incorporate more simplified and resilient design features [35].…”

Attack Surface Analysis of the Digital Twins interface with Advanced Sensor and Instrumentation Interfaces: Cyber Threat Assessment and Attack Demonstration for Digital Twins in Advanced Reactor Architectures

“…As the lifecycle of the system progresses, the right side of the "V" indicates a bottom-up approach through the implementation and testing of each layer from the component layer to the subsystem to the system layer [49]. [50] In scrutinizing Figure 11, the meticulous structuring and systematic progression of the DOT Vee model become palpably apparent, offering viewers a tangible visual representation of an engineering paradigm. The figure illustrates the cascade from a holistic system viewpoint down through its constituent subsystems and components, embodying a decomposition that ensures every minute detail is considered, scrutinized, and validated in the developmental phase.…”

“…Figure 11: DOT Vee or the Engineering Vee Department of Transportation Systems Engineering Process[50] …”

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

“…Barring the introduction of new severe-accident risks by including an NPP in an IES, a higher-level, less detailed, more qualitative approach is warranted if the goal is to understand the behavior of IESs. A partial example can be found in [47]. That study performed a hazard analysis, rather than a PRA, to understand potential risks.…”