Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks

Ralston, Patricia A. S.; Graham, James H.; Hieb, Jeffrey L.

doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2007.04.003

Cited by 215 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Since the TA architecture considers issues across each OTI viewpoint, the inclusion or adaptation of any method that could support them was vital. While existing methods [23][24][25][26][27] provide interesting insight into the assessment of security, it appears some may face challenges when considering multiple OTI viewpoints. Through basic adaptation, the method in [28] appears to provide a good starting point.…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat awareness for critical infrastructures resilience

Gouglidis

Green

Busby

et al. 2016

2016 8th International Workshop on Resilient Networks Design and Modeling (RNDM)

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Abstract-Utility networks are part of every nation's critical infrastructure, and their protection is now seen as a high priority objective. In this paper, we propose a threat awareness architecture for critical infrastructures, which we believe will raise security awareness and increase resilience in utility networks. We first describe an investigation of trends and threats that may impose security risks in utility networks. This was performed on the basis of a viewpoint approach that is capable of identifying technical and non-technical issues (e.g., behaviour of humans). The result of our analysis indicated that utility networks are affected strongly by technological trends, but that humans comprise an important threat to them. This provided evidence and confirmed that the protection of utility networks is a multi-variable problem, and thus, requires the examination of information stemming from various viewpoints of a network. In order to accomplish our objective, we propose a systematic threat awareness architecture in the context of a resilience strategy, which ultimately aims at providing and maintaining an acceptable level of security and safety in critical infrastructures. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate partially via a case study the application of the proposed threat awareness architecture, where we examine the potential impact of attacks in the context of social engineering in a European utility company.

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Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat awareness for critical infrastructures resilience

Gouglidis

Green

Busby

et al. 2016

2016 8th International Workshop on Resilient Networks Design and Modeling (RNDM)

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“…Due to the evolution of technology, the advanced version of DNP3 provides interconnectivity over the Internet; the information travels through non-proprietary protocols, which reside below DNP3 [5,19]. Due to open connectivity, DNP3 has been vulnerable to Internet attacks; most DNP3 devices are configured, and communicate without any proper authentication mechanism or have little protection in the SCADA network against vulnerabilities [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Cryptography based security mechanisms [31] have been proposed for DNP3 by DNP3 users group, in which symmetric and asymmetric methods are defined and a detailed description of challenge-response technique is made to examine the security goals (or parameters), such as authentication and integrity, and to protect the transmission against attacks, such as replay, spoofing, and modification attacks [8,32,33], at the application layer.…”

Section: Background Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

et al. 2015

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Modern technology enhancements have been used worldwide to fulfill the requirements of the industrial sector, especially in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems as a part of industrial control systems (ICS). SCADA systems have gained popularity in industrial automations due to technology enhancements and connectivity with modern computer networks and/or protocols. The procurement of new technologies has made SCADA systems important and helpful to processing in oil lines, water treatment plants, and electricity generation and control stations. On the other hand, these systems have vulnerabilities like other traditional computer networks (or systems), especially when interconnected with open platforms. Many international organizations and researchers have proposed and deployed solutions for SCADA security enhancement, but most of these have been based on node-to-node security, without emphasizing critical sessions that are linked directly with industrial processing and automation. This study concerns SCADA security measures related to critical processing with specified sessions of automated polling, analyzing cryptography mechanisms and deploying the appropriate explicit inclusive security solution in a distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) stack, as part of a SCADA system. The bytes flow through the DNP3 stack with security OPEN ACCESSSymmetry 2015, 7 1946 computational bytes within specified critical intervals defined for polling. We took critical processing knowledge into account when designing a SCADA/DNP3 testbed and deploying a cryptography solution that did not affect communications.

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“…• Hackers can intrude, modify, destroy or exfiltrate data thereby causing disruption to systems and networks [17,21] and/or DoS.…”

Section: Cyber Vulnerabilities In Scada Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Availiability Confidentiality infrastructures [16], include the risks from loss of service (e.g., electricity, traffic or process control), financial sector services, property and environmental damage and potential loss of life [17].…”

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confidence: 99%

Quantifying the impact of unavailability in cyber-physical environments

Aissa

Abercrombie

Sheldon

et al. 2014

2014 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security (CICS)

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Abstract-The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system discussed in this work manages a distributed control network for the Tunisian Electric & Gas Utility. The network is dispersed over a large geographic area that monitors and controls the flow of electricity/gas from both remote and centralized locations. The availability of the SCADA system in this context is critical to ensuring the uninterrupted delivery of energy, including safety, security, continuity of operations and revenue. Such SCADA systems are the backbone of national critical cyber-physical infrastructures. Herein, we propose adapting the Mean Failure Cost (MFC) metric for quantifying the cost of unavailability. This new metric combines the classic availability formulation with MFC. The resulting metric, socalled Econometric Availability (EA), offers a computational basis to evaluate a system in terms of the gain/loss ($/hour of operation) that affects each stakeholder due to unavailability.

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Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks

Cited by 215 publications

References 29 publications

Threat awareness for critical infrastructures resilience

Threat awareness for critical infrastructures resilience

New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

Quantifying the impact of unavailability in cyber-physical environments

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