Dangerous bargains with the devil? Incorporating new approaches in peace science for the study of war

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin

doi:10.1177/0738894216667621

Cited by 36 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 92 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Additionally, "irrational" variables such as emotion, status, and leadership could also be factored into the bargaining model of conflict (Little & Zeitzoff, 2017). The bargaining model of war also highlights primary factors that may increase the risk of wars, particularly information asymmetries (about the enemy), commitment problems (including leadership, regime type, and relative capabilities), and issue indivisibility (Mitchell, 2016). This bargaining theory may provide explanation and policy implications for the weaker SCS claimant states in response to Chinese coercion in a certain context.…”

Section: Asymmetric Relations Between Weaker Nations and Large Powers...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Facing the Ravenous Sea Dragon: How Weaker Nations Confront Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This publication and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

show abstract

Section: Asymmetric Relations Between Weaker Nations and Large Powers...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Facing the Ravenous Sea Dragon: How Weaker Nations Confront Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, these studies have treated all amnesties as a stand-alone event, examined with variables that are unchanging or that hardly vary. Given that we are trying to understand tactical choices, such static theories limit what we can know (Mitchell 2017). I argue that we need to delve deeper into the dynamic of the conflict and take a more nuanced approach to when amnesties serve the government.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

Daniels

2021

International Studies Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

show abstract

“…Kressel and Pruitt (1989) argue that mediators who intend to improve the atmosphere between the parties to a conflict are the clearest embodiment of the traditional view that mediators are catalysts and facilitators rather than arm-twisters or proponents of a particular solution. With respect to intrastate conflict, because governments have incentives to eliminate rebel leaders when conflicts end, third parties’ commitments for peace agreements may allay the weaker side’s fear and consequently increase the chances of a peaceful settlement (Mitchell, 2016). Svensson (2007) argues that a potential mediator who is biased toward the government may remedy the rebels’ commitment problem when they need to negotiate and agree to terminate their violent behavior because the rebel side sends a costly signal of conciliatory intention by accepting a government-biased mediator, whereas a mediator who is biased toward the rebels may have fewer incentives to protect the government if the rebels renege on a peace deal.…”

Section: Disentangling Bias: Theories and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling bias: national capabilities, regime type, and international conflict mediation

Chen

2017

Conflict Management and Peace Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing literature on bias and third-party conflict management mainly focuses on the dichotomy of whether the mediator’s bias as a whole can contribute to mediation onset and outcomes. I argue that we need more specific and disaggregated research on the mediator’s bias because the side on which a prospective mediator’s bias lies may significantly affect the likelihood of mediation onset. Why are some biased mediations initiated by third parties while others are not? By disentangling the mediator’s bias and by distinguishing between different levels of bias, I find that the likelihood of mediation onset tends to increase if the potential mediator shares a closer political relationship with a conflicting state that has greater national capabilities or that is more authoritarian than the counterparty. However, the effect is largely conditional on the levels of the mediator’s bias, where a more obvious level of bias is more likely to facilitate mediation initiation. This article advances our understanding of bias and international conflict mediation.

show abstract

Dangerous bargains with the devil? Incorporating new approaches in peace science for the study of war

Cited by 36 publications

References 92 publications

Facing the Ravenous Sea Dragon: How Weaker Nations Confront Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea

Facing the Ravenous Sea Dragon: How Weaker Nations Confront Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

Disentangling bias: national capabilities, regime type, and international conflict mediation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About