“Dango” Experiments

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Une, Masashi; Yamaguchi, Tomohiro

doi:10.1006/jjie.1996.0001

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Our additional prohibition on discussing nonobservable aspects of previous outcomes and our emphasis that participants were not obligated to comply with the terms of any agreement were intended to make defections of the sort observed by Davis and Holt (1998) a possibility. Finally note that Saijo et al (1996) allowed considerably more in latitude in participants' communications than in any of the other studies referenced here. These essentially unrestricted communications were consistent with the strong-form conspiratorial arrangements that were the focus of their investigation.…”

Section: Experiments Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…However, explicit conspiracies are much more successful in retail-type posted-price markets (Isaac, Ramey, andWilliams, 1984 andSiajo, Une, andYamaguchi, 1996) and in sealed bid auctions (Isaac and Walker, 1985).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In double-auction markets, which characterize trading in many financial exchanges, Isaac and Plott (1981) report that sellers are generally unable to raise prices when given an explicit opportunity to talk among themselves. However, explicit conspiracies are much more successful in retail-type posted-price markets (Isaac et al, 1984;Saijo et al, 1996) and in sealedbid auctions (Isaac and Walker, 1985).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our additional prohibition on discussing non-observable aspects of previous outcomes, and our emphasis that participants were not obligated to comply with the terms of any agreement were intended to make defections of the sort observed by Davis and Holt (1998) a possibility. Finally note that Siajo, Une and Yamaguchi (1996) allowed considerably more in latitude in participants'…”

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confidence: 99%

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Collusion in Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Davis

Wilson

2002

Economic Inquiry

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Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that, given the opportunity, sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, non-collusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: In an environment where identical prices are predicted in a non-collusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.

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Section: Experiments Design and Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collusion in Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Davis

Wilson

2002

Economic Inquiry

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“…By nominating a superior contractor, it becomes possible to assure the quality of work. The disadvantage is the increased probability of collusion, because the number of bid participants is restricted (Saijo, Une, & Yamaguchi, 1994). It is hard for companies from other areas and new companies to join the auctions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

MoRVAM: A reverse Vickrey auction system for mobile commerce

Shih

Lin

Huang

2007

Expert Systems with Applications

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Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects: Evidence from Japanese Esco Market

Iimi

2016

Rev Ind Organ

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Policy Research Working Paper 6485Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only prices but also other nonmonetary aspects need to be taken into account. Multidimensional auctions are often used to evaluate multidimensional bids. This paper examines the bidding strategy in multidimensional auctions, using data from This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Departmen, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world.

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“Dango” Experiments

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Collusion in Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Collusion in Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Examination

MoRVAM: A reverse Vickrey auction system for mobile commerce

Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects: Evidence from Japanese Esco Market

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