By laboring underneath the radar of formal law, using a diverse array of conceptual tools and working from material disregarded by mainstream legal scholarship, Fleur Johns' research has consistently opened up novel ways of grappling with international legal problems. The article at the focal point of this symposium continues to push the envelope of international legal studies. It sheds light on how the rise of Big Data and algorithmic decisionmaking is transforming international authority. It also speaks to the increasing deformalization of international law. Examining the mundane practices of global governance may sound unrevealing to some. But Johns shows how this approach can yield important insights into international law's operations and effects.Rather than focusing on the "sensational jurisprudence" of this text, my intervention highlights two important analytical moves that Johns makes: studying international law through its technical practices and deploying a descriptive method to capture and critique its movements. 1 These moves sound straightforward, yet they rarely feature in international legal scholarship. By situating Johns' approach within broader debates unfolding in the social sciences and sociolegal studies, this essay aims to help bridge the theoretical gap. 2 I discuss the key analytical advantages of Johns' approach and also set out some questions and tensions that arose in my reading of the text. In short, this article is refreshing, critical, and generative. It maps how automation is changing international organizations and global governance and provokes us to ask how power might be redistributed in the process.
PracticesThe first key move that this article makes is to analyze international law as an effect of material practices. Rather than offering a doctrinal reading of recent changes to nuclear nonproliferation or international refugee law, Johns zooms in on the everyday practices and techniques through which "international institutions and other agents of international law take in or record seemingly unprocessed data about the world and its human and nonhuman inhabitants." 3 Such a practice-based approach remains relatively novel in the domain of international law, where most accounts still privilege positive norms, formal binding powers and "solid authority" models as the cause and effect of legal change. 4 Yet it resonates with recent shifts in social science scholarship aimed at showing how objects, legal forms, relations, and institutions are enacted through practice.