Data, Metadata, Mental Data? Privacy and the Extended Mind

Palermos, S. Orestis

doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2148772

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…iv Several authors have explored the implications of the extended mind thesis for rights over, or duties with respect to, the mind. See, for example, Levy, 14 Anderson, 32 Buller, 18 Glannon, 19 Palermos 20 and Clowes et al 21 Our discussion differs from these earlier discussions in two regards. First, we are focusing specifically on one putative right of the mind: the right to mental integrity.…”

Section: The Right To Mental Integritymentioning

confidence: 57%

“…43 Palermos contends that an extended mind perspective would have significant implications for the right to mental privacy, as it would imply that information stored in external devices, which is relatively easy to access, could include mental data. 20 He therefore argues for expansion of the right to mental privacy to include such data if the EMT holds true.…”

Section: Extended Essaymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesis

Tesink,

Douglas,

Forsberg

et al. 2024

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The possibility of neurotechnological interference with our brain and mind raises questions about the moral rights that would protect against the (mis)use of these technologies. One such moral right that has received recent attention is the right to mental integrity. Though the metaphysical boundaries of the mind are a matter of live debate, most defences of this moral right seem to assume an internalist (brain-based) view of the mind. In this article, we will examine what an extended account of the mind might imply for the right to mental integrity and the protection it provides against neurotechnologies. We argue that, on an extended account of the mind, the scope of the right to mental integrity would expand significantly, implying that neurotechnologies would no longer pose a uniquely serious threat to the right. In addition, some neurotechnologies may even be protected by the right to mental integrity, as the technologies would becomepart ofthe mind. We conclude that adopting an extended account of the mind has significant implications for the right to mental integrity in terms of its protective scope and capacity to protect against neurotechnologies, demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the mind play an important role in determining the moral protection provided by the right.

show abstract

Section: The Right To Mental Integritymentioning

confidence: 57%

Section: Extended Essaymentioning

confidence: 99%

Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesis

Tesink,

Douglas,

Forsberg

et al. 2024

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Development of various technological aids and prosthetics blurred the boundaries of originally biological persons, and a number of authors argue that in some cases we can talk about extended or hybrid persons -persons that are partly constituted by highly integrated artifactual aids to cognitive and perceptual processing of these extended systems (Clowes 2020;Hongladarom 2016;Milojevic 2020;Piredda & Candiotto 2019). These blurred boundaries already started to have an effect on legal practice when it comes to deciding if a certain damage to an artifact is just another property damage or a personal injury, like in the case of the damage of Neil Harbisson's "eyeborg" (see Milojevic 2017), but also in cases of privacy violations under the assumption that mental states can be stored on external devices (Palermos 2022).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The notion of a person

Milojević¹

2023

Belgrade Philosop Ann

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this article is to clarify the content of the concept "person" as it figures in philosophical debates about personhood and personal identity. In order to do so, I will look at both specific philosophical problems that ask for a clear definition of this notion, as well as at the history of this concept's formation, and try to motivate the specific assumptions that are tightly connected to it.

show abstract