No abstract

The main concern of this paper is John Perry's attempt to analyze phenomenal knowledge in a way that avoids the objection which states that the non-deducibility of this kind of knowledge leads to the ontological conclusion that physicalism must be false. The attempt in question determines the content of phenomenal knowledge with a help of the reflexive-referential semantic theory which enables us to explain a growth in knowledge without introducing new (non-physical) facts on the subject matter level as the object of this new knowledge. I will argue that even on the assumption that the case of phenomenal knowledge is just another case of recognition knowledge, as Perry argues, the end result of the analysis suffers from unavoidable inconsistencies and the given analysis of the content of phenomenal knowledge proves to be incompatible with the basic assumptions of the central argumentation

In this paper I argue that we need to rethink the boundary between a person and its property. I will first motivate the claim that we should extend the boundaries of persons, and consider three different arguments offered in the recent literature with similar intentions: a) ?Ship of Theseus? argument, b) ?Continuity between physical persons and corporations as legal persons? and c) ?Simple Extended cognition? argument. After addressing the shortcomings of these offered arguments I will present my own argument based on the Parity argument for cognitive extension. [Project of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Grant no. 179041: Dynamical systems in nature and society: philosophical and empirical aspects]

Anti-individualists, which hold that subject's thoughts are not wholly individuated by her intrinsic states, are accused of undermining subject's ability to reason well and that they do not capture correctly the epistemic position of a thinking subject. These accusations are based on anti-individualist's rejection of transparency of thought content which allows that otherwise rational subjects may fail to make valid inferences, may have contradictory beliefs, and may make invalid inferences. By distinguishing between two kinds of anti-individualism, Fregean and non-Fregean, Jessica Brown (2004) argues that while Fregean anti-individualism better fits our intuitions about rationality it introduces an unavoidable internal friction between the endorsement of Frege's principle of content difference and rejection of transparency of difference of content, which renders it untenable. In his 2008 paper Sanford Goldberg tries to motivate these two principles on different grounds, thus providing an account of anti-individualism which is completely compatible with Frege's principle which should secure subject's rationality. We critically assess these claims to conclude that attempts to reconcile traditional notion of rationality and antiindividualism by way of saving validity of Frege's principle fail in their intentions.

The aim of this paper is to show how a new outlook on human cognitive abilities, and in accordance with this a different view of rationality, can influence semantics and one of the most prominent debates in this field, namely, conflict between Fregeans and non Fregean anti-indiviidualists. This new account of rationality will help us difuse some of the main motivators for Fregean view of semantics and it will help us in justifying non-Fregean anti-individualism but also in eliminating some of the apparent contradictions in Fregean anti-individualism of, e.g. Campbell and Evans. In this attempt of bringing together some of the latest insights into human cognition and semantics I will be dealing mainly with Jessica Brown's outlook on motivation for Fregean sense and Ruth Millikan's embedded view on rationality