Extended personhood - rethinking property/person distinction

Milojević, Miljana

doi:10.2298/theo1704055m

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…U tom duhu Lok tvrdi o "osobi" sledeće: "To je forenzički termin, koji podrazumeva dela i zasluge; i zato pripada samo razumnim delatnicima, sposobnim za pravo, radost i bedu. (Locke 1975: knjiga II, poglavlje XXVII, član 26) Ovde kao i u (Milojević 2017a;Milojević 2017b;Milojević 2020) argumentujem da teza o proširenom kognitivnom sopstvu ili proširenoj osobi sledi iz teze o proširenom umu i kogniciji ukoliko joj se pridruže odgovarajuće pretpostavke o dijahroničnom ličnom identitetu kakve možemo naći kod Parfita (1984). U nastavku će biti iznesen argument za odbranu teze o proširenom umu, odnosno kogniciji 2 , kao i argument za proširenje kognitivnog sopstva.…”

Section: Prošireno Kognitivno Sopstvo Ili Proširena Osobaunclassified

Extended self

Milojević

2020

Theoria

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In this paper I aim to show that in the debate about the nature of the self one concept, the concept of the cognitive self, has a theoretical primacy over other conceptual alternatives because of its connection with the concept of a person in the debate about personal identity. Consequently, I will offer a defence of the hypothesis that the Extended Mind thesis implies the Extended Cognitive Self thesis if we additionally assume Parfit?s Psychological criterium of personal identity. After I consider several counterarguments to the claim that the Extended Mind implies the Extended Self, I will offer their criticism and show that they either distort the original Extended Mind thesis or introduce hardly defensible metaphysical assumptions. To one such assumption, that claims that one mind can contain another, I will pay special attention. By careful examination it will be shown that such assumption can be kept only if the relation between the mereologically connected minds is such that prevents psychological continuity between them, while it has to be abandoned if there is a psychological continuity between such minds because it would produce numerous problems such as the problem of too many thinkers, the proliferation of minds, the concept of the person would become useless, etc. Also, these considerations will lead us to the clear demarcation line between those approaches that claim the possibility of group minds and those that claim that there are extended minds. Their key difference will be in taking contrary stances towards the relation of psychological continuity when it comes to different wide minds and their biological constituents. This will be one of the main results of this paper, together with the defence of the Extended Cognitive Self thesis.

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Section: Prošireno Kognitivno Sopstvo Ili Proširena Osobaunclassified