De la fraude en gestion à la gestion de la fraude. Une revue de la littérature

Maux, Julien Le; Smaïli, Nadia; Ben‐Amar, Walid

doi:10.3166/rfg.231.73-85

“…Le renvoi à la gestion managériale des risques opérationnels (Lamarque et Maurer, ) incite à trouver une réponse au problème dans le contrôle informel, c’est‐à‐dire dans les relations de pouvoir et non d’autorité (Bouquin, ). A l’occasion d’une revue de littérature centrée sur la fraude, Le Maux, Smaïli et Ben Amar () suggèrent eux aussi que les hypothèses issues de la théorie positive de la comptabilité ne fournissent pas de réponses suffisantes au problème. A ceci près que dans le cas présent, les traders disposent de marges de manœuvre conséquentes pour exercer un pouvoir sur leurs supérieurs hiérarchiques.…”

Section: Discussion : L’expertise Du Trading Un Risque Opérationnel unclassified

Comprendre les pratiques des experts pour être en mesure de contrôler leur activité – l’exemple du trading

Jardat¹,

Méric

²

,

Sfez

³

2018

Can J Adm Sci

0

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Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…The nature of operational risk management (Lamarque & Maurer, ) suggests that a solution may be found in informal control—that is, in power relationships as opposed to authority (Bouquin, ). In their literature review on fraud, Le Maux, Smaïli, and Ben Amar () also suggested that positive‐accounting hypotheses did not provide adequate solutions, notably because traders currently enjoy a considerable margin of authority under their superiors. When questioned, by their own initiative, they suggested reversing this relationship by beating them at their own game.…”

Section: Discussion: Trading Expertise—a Manageable Operational Risk?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding expert practices in order to control expert activities: The case of trading

Jardat¹,

Méric

²

,

Sfez

³

2018

Can J Adm Sci

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Fraud detection using fraud triangle theory: evidence from China

Rahman

¹

,

Xu²

2022

JFC

5

0

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Purpose This study aims to explore the relationship between fraud triangle theory (FTT) and the accounting fraud phenomenon in all listed companies in China. Design/methodology/approach The CSMAR database is used as the sample, including 16,063 data of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen markets for the 2010–2020 period. The authors also use quantitative methods, such as regression analysis, to investigate the relationship between five variables (cover three elements of FTT) and fraud occurrence. Findings Results show that leverage and liquidity ratios positively affect fraud detection, whereas return on net equity, audit size and independent director percentage negatively affect fraud detection. Originality/value This study enriches theoretical research on the causes of accounting fraud in China and is of great significance to the sound development of China’s capital market.

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De la fraude en gestion à la gestion de la fraude. Une revue de la littérature

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Comprendre les pratiques des experts pour être en mesure de contrôler leur activité – l’exemple du trading

Comprendre les pratiques des experts pour être en mesure de contrôler leur activité – l’exemple du trading

Understanding expert practices in order to control expert activities: The case of trading

Fraud detection using fraud triangle theory: evidence from China

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