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Purpose – Financial intermediaries have contributed to the growing complexity of transactions and to an emerging relational network within markets. This article considers the Eurobond market as an organization in which members adopt rationalities along with diversified and evolving courses of action. The purpose of this paper is to mobilize both historical analysis and organizational theories to show what history can bring to organizational theories using a specific financial market as a case study. Design/methodology/approach – The author used a methodology based on historical events and on a long-run analysis of practices. Professional sources, academic research and databases allow the author to follow an abductive approach. Observations set out of this double perspective are confronted with the conceptual frames of organizational theories. Findings – During the creation and organization stage, the Eurobond market adopts the pattern of a market organization. Then, it takes the pattern of a firm organization as defined by Coase and Alchian and Demsetz or it is a hybrid pattern as Williamson corpus is concerned. In its last stage of evolution, it reveals as a firm organization for all economic models of organizations. Originality/value – The confrontation of an historical methodology with the economic model of organization leads to the conclusion that the Eurobond market cannot be apprehended as an organization market anymore since it has become a firm organization. Traditional regulation of financial markets does not apply since a firm pattern cannot be controlled as a market one.

Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.