Deadlines in stochastic contests

Lang, Matthias; Seel, Christian; Strack, Philipp

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.003

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In a very general setting, they characterize the optimal prize structure and find that with convex costs and risk-averse agents, multiple prizes are optimal. Lang, Seel, and Strack (2014) is related to our result about the optimal contest length T . They consider a two-player FPC where agents exert effort over time and breakthroughs arrive according to a Poisson process.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 63%

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

Benkert

Letina

2020

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. (JEL D82, O32)

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 63%

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

Benkert

Letina

2020

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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“…However, some authors observed different results. Lang et al (2014) argued that a shorter duration reduces solvers' solving time, but increases the intensity of the contest in solvers, noting that seekers can achieve higher returns in a shorter period of time [22]. Dong et al (2016) used data from Taskcn.com and analyzed the impact of task duration on the performance of crowdsourcing contests, finding that with increases in task duration, the effort costs of solvers became higher than the rewards, thereby reducing the number of submissions [23].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nonlinear Impact of Task Rewards and Duration on Solvers’ Participation Behavior: A Study on Online Crowdsourcing Platform

Yang

2021

JTAER

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Crowdsourcing has attracted significant attention in the past decade because it has more competitive advantages than traditional methods for mobilizing distributed labor and utilizing innovation. Crowdsourcing contests are one of the most popular and effective crowdsourcing modes. Reasonable task rewards and duration are the key factors for seekers to attract solvers who can efficiently participate in the crowdsourcing contest task. Previous studies have mainly focused on task results to analyze solvers’ participation behavior in crowdsourcing contests, but have paid little attention to the task process, and there have been conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of task rewards and duration on solvers’ participation behavior and the performance of crowdsourcing contests. In view of this gap, this study collected 2706 logo design task data points from 2015–2017 on an online crowdsourcing platform and measured the performance of solvers’ participation behavior in two stages. The participation time was used to represent the performance of solvers’ participation behavior in the task process, while the number of submissions of solutions was used to represent the performance of participation behavior in the task result. The results show that task rewards and duration have an inverted U-shaped effect on the number of submissions, money rewards have a positive impact on participation time, and duration has an inverted U-shaped relationship with participation time. This study proposes the nonlinear effects of task rewards and duration on participation behavior and explains the reason for the conflicting results of previous studies. This paper also expands upon existing research by using solvers’ participation time in the task process to measure the performance of solvers’ participation behavior.

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“…If, on the other hand, cost functions are convex, it may be optimal to offer multiple prizes. Lang et al (2014) consider a two-player, fixed-price contest where sellers exert effort over time and breakthroughs arrive according to a Poisson process. The seller with the most breakthroughs wins.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

Benkert

Letina

2016

SSRN Journal

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This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the optimal contest attains the first-best. More generally, we show that global stopping rules can be implemented robustly and compare them to individual stopping rules which have been analyzed in the existing literature. We conclude by discussing policy implications of our findings and highlight that global stopping rules combine the best aspects of innovation races and research tournaments.

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Deadlines in stochastic contests

Cited by 16 publications

References 15 publications

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

The Nonlinear Impact of Task Rewards and Duration on Solvers’ Participation Behavior: A Study on Online Crowdsourcing Platform

Designing Dynamic Research Contests

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