2013
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12043
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Debt Crises and Risk‐Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

Abstract: Using a variance decomposition of shocks to gross domestic product (GDP), we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk‐sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the subperiods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk‐sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving, and show that fiscal austerity programs played an i… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
20
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 53 publications
(22 citation statements)
references
References 30 publications
2
20
0
Order By: Relevance
“…8(2), [106][107][108][109][110][111][112][113][114]2019 In this article, we calculate the degree of public and private risk-sharing in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this sense, this paper is close to the literature measuring risk-sharing from an international perspective, such as Afonso and Furceri (2008), Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2014), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015), Alcidi and Thirion (2016) and Poncela et al (2016). Similar to these studies, we conclude that public risk-sharing is low in the EMU, while private risk-sharing is skewed towards bank credit.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…8(2), [106][107][108][109][110][111][112][113][114]2019 In this article, we calculate the degree of public and private risk-sharing in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this sense, this paper is close to the literature measuring risk-sharing from an international perspective, such as Afonso and Furceri (2008), Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2014), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015), Alcidi and Thirion (2016) and Poncela et al (2016). Similar to these studies, we conclude that public risk-sharing is low in the EMU, while private risk-sharing is skewed towards bank credit.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 69%
“…The chart shows that the strength of the risk-sharing mechanisms in the EA countries is rather limited, compared with the United States (see also Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2014); Alcidi and Thirion (2016); Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015) and Poncela et al (2016)). It is remarkable that the non-smoothed shock (the yellow bar) has been stable around 40% to 60%, close to the estimates in Afonso and Furceri (2008).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Curious enough, Greece, Portugal and Spain (jointly with Ireland and Italy that also have significant factor loadings of the same sign) constitute the so called PIIGS group, peripheral European countries where risk sharing has collapsed during the last recession and subsequent sovereign debt crisis. Kalemki-Ozcan et al (2014) point out that the governments of these countries did not save during the expansionary phases of the business cycle and were not able to borrow on the international markets during the crisis due to the high levels of outstanding public debt. Ireland is also included in this set although its case is slightly different, with government deficits related to banking failures; see Kalemki-Ozcan et al (2014).…”
Section: Empirical Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kalemki-Ozcan et al (2014) point out that the governments of these countries did not save during the expansionary phases of the business cycle and were not able to borrow on the international markets during the crisis due to the high levels of outstanding public debt. Ireland is also included in this set although its case is slightly different, with government deficits related to banking failures; see Kalemki-Ozcan et al (2014). This might be the reason why Ireland is included in this group instead of within the Anglo-Saxon countries.…”
Section: Empirical Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The most striking difference between the US and EMU is the very low degree of risk-sharing via capital markets (i.e. international factor income) in EMU compared to the US (between 0-10% in the Eurozone vs. almost 40% in the US) (Kalemli-Ozcan et al, 2014). Alleviating of negative shocks in the euro area occurs mainly through the credit channel: cross-border saving and borrowing.…”
Section: Theoretical Approach To Fiscal Integration Within the Euro Areamentioning
confidence: 99%