2012
DOI: 10.1017/s0047279412000335
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Decentralising the Active Welfare State: The Relevance of Intergovernmental Structures in Italy and Spain

Abstract: This article contributes to the literatures on the governance of activation and the territorial structure of the welfare state by drawing attention to the institutional designs of active welfare states and the architectures of decentralisation, as well as to their manifestations and implications. With the end of capturing dissimilar intergovernmental models of activation, this paper develops a framework of 'centre-regional' relations, which we apply to the cases of Italy and Spain -two countries that have devo… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…As Obinger and Starke (2014) put it, ‘institutional veto points have decisively impeded the expansion of the welfare state’ (p. 4). In an era of multi-level governance, two factors are pivotal in this: the constitutional powers available to meso-government (Banting, 1987) and intergovernmental relations between central (or federal) administrations and regional executives (López-Santana and Moyer, 2012; Obinger, 2005). In turn, the latter depends upon the ideological (dis-)alignment of the parties holding office in the different political centres, and whether this leads to conflict or cooperation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Obinger and Starke (2014) put it, ‘institutional veto points have decisively impeded the expansion of the welfare state’ (p. 4). In an era of multi-level governance, two factors are pivotal in this: the constitutional powers available to meso-government (Banting, 1987) and intergovernmental relations between central (or federal) administrations and regional executives (López-Santana and Moyer, 2012; Obinger, 2005). In turn, the latter depends upon the ideological (dis-)alignment of the parties holding office in the different political centres, and whether this leads to conflict or cooperation.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existing work highlights how central governments may constrain the social policy-making of regional administrations. In an era of multi-level governance, the following two factors are pivotal: the constitutional powers available to meso-government and inter-governmental relations between central (or federal) administrations and regional executives (López-santana and Moyer, 2012). In turn, the latter is shaped by the ideological (dis-)alignment of the parties holding office in the different political centres, and whether this leads to conflict or cooperation.…”
Section: Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the literature on the subject, there has been intense debate about the potential advantages and disadvantages of such shift. On the one hand, the general trend towards decentralization and increased autonomy of government at the sub‐national level has been seen as a crucial strategy to make social programmes more efficient and tailored to citizens' needs (Andreotti & Mingione, 2014; López‐Santana & Moyer, 2012). Such decentralization of responsibilities has also been seen as key to implementing social innovation and more effective synergies between public and private actors (Andreotti & Mingione, 2014), as well as an opportunity to introduce experimental policies that can be scaled up to the national level (Bonoli & Champion, 2014).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%