No abstract

The architecture of fiscal federalism in the United States represents an obstacle for prompt and comprehensive policy responses to economic crises, especially by subnational levels of government. As both a public health and economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic has put unique fiscal pressures on subnational governments. This article reviews the pandemic’s fiscal effects on these governments, as well as the federal government’s response. By comparing the response to the COVID-19 crisis during the Trump administration with the response to the Great Recession during the Obama administration, we show that while the speed and magnitude of federal aid was unprecedented in 2020, it was nevertheless conditional in nature and beset by familiar political and institutional obstacles. Despite major fiscal pressures, state revenues rebounded earlier than expected, in part due to the relaxation of public health measures and the collection of taxes from online transactions; yet, state resources remained strained throughout the year, especially in states reliant on the hospitality and the oil sectors. And while local property taxes were buoyed by a surging housing market, cities and counties were confronted with declining revenue from other sources and intense emergency spending needs. Thus, despite unprecedented levels of federal support for state and local governments, the legacies of “fend for yourself” federalism live on.

This article contributes to the literatures on the governance of activation and the territorial structure of the welfare state by drawing attention to the institutional designs of active welfare states and the architectures of decentralisation, as well as to their manifestations and implications. With the end of capturing dissimilar intergovernmental models of activation, this paper develops a framework of 'centre-regional' relations, which we apply to the cases of Italy and Spain -two countries that have devolved active labour market policy powers to their regions but have organised power-sharing structures very differently. The findings suggest that when it comes to active welfare states, horizontal arrangements are linked to salient institutional variations across the territory. By contrast, hierarchical structures, which are characterised by a dominant role of central level governments, are linked to higher levels of cohesion. These findings are relevant as they expose the manifestations and implications of distinct decentralisation models on activation regimes, welfare states, as well as on welfare clients.

No abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the emergence, consolidation, recalibration, and liberalization of employment policies in Spain. By identifying five developmental periods, it reviews transformations in the nature and regulation of labour market policies from the early 1900s to the mid-2010s. In addition, it explores changes in the territorial organization and governance of labour-market policies with a focus on decentralization, (re-) centralization, and delegation reforms. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Great Recession on Spanish labour market policies and structures, including its dualized labour market. All in all, the chapter sheds much light on the nature and changes of the Spanish welfare state since the early twentieth century.