Decentralization as a Post-Conflict Strategy: Local Government Discretion and Accountability in Sierra Leone

Abstract

Summary Sierra Leone has made progress in recovering from a decade‐long civil war, in part due to decentralization. As a post‐conflict stabilization strategy, decentralization has been effective in satisfying the desire for more equitable political representation, and three rounds of peaceful elections have strengthened democratic norms. However, more needs to be performed to strengthen local governments in order to address regional horizontal inequity. Solely political decentralization is not sufficient in addressing regional differences in pro‐poor service delivery, which was a key driver of conflict. It requires broader commitment to establish a functioning local government system, including central government subscription to the tenets of administrative and fiscal decentralization. Though Sierra Leone has remained stable in terms of political violence, recent data show that the nation has not made great strides in addressing weak and inequitable social service delivery. This paper argues that this stagnation is a product of the incomplete nature of the post‐conflict stabilization strategy of decentralization and that correcting this failure will require strong commitment from the central government to implementing the full measure of the existing legal framework for decentralization. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Building horizontal coordination in Sri Lanka

“…Although horizontal coordination is widely advocated (Christopoulos et al, 2012;Peters, 2006), developing countries such as Sri Lanka have been slow to adopt it; they experience greater tension between horizontal and vertical coordination (Samaratunge, Coghill, & Herath, 2012) than developed countries with their wellentrenched bureaucratic structures and cultures (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007b). Arguably, poor horizontal coordination in developing countries derives partly from dominant vertical relationships in public administration and weak political will for innovative reform (Wijeweera, 1989), and partly from specific governance practices (Edwards, Yilmaz, & Boex, 2015), and contradictory effects (Faguet, 2014;Samaratunge et al, 2012). Weak horizontal coordination is further exacerbated by severe limitations in (a) knowledge transfer (Wiig, 2002), (b) political commitment to administrative reform (Laegreid et al, 2015), (c) capacity to manage upwards (Moore, 1995), and (d) willingness to embrace and implement change in delivery and policy (Soubliere & Cloutier, 2015).…”

Decentralization as a Post‐Conflict Stabilization Tool: The Case of Sierra Leone

“…The council does not have direct control over either set of local staff. 25 According to Edwards et al (2015), student-teacher ratios are inequitable across districts, ranging from 20 students per teacher in Bo Township to over 50 students per teacher in Kambia District. The situation is similar in the health sector: The number of health professionals per 100,000 population varies from 10.1 in Kailahun to 148.3 in Freetown.…”

“…Given its successes to date in achieving political stability, and in the light of the ongoing challenge of delivering on key promises made during the immediate post‐conflict period, Sierra Leone offers an important case study in understanding the role of decentralization in the post‐conflict period, particularly with respect to decentralization as a multi‐part concept. Earlier work analyzed the progress toward decentralization in its constituent parts and concluded that “[t]he post‐conflict stabilization strategy of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization has proven successful in preventing a return to violence” (Edwards et al ., , p. 59). It has also suggested that the inefficient and horizontally inequitable distribution of critical social services, which is a direct result of partial decentralization, threatens the progress made toward long‐lasting peace and stability (Edwards et al ., ).…”

“…Earlier work analyzed the progress toward decentralization in its constituent parts and concluded that "[t]he post-conflict stabilization strategy of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization has proven successful in preventing a return to violence" (Edwards et al, 2015, p. 59). It has also suggested that the inefficient and horizontally inequitable distribution of critical social services, which is a direct result of partial decentralization, 1 threatens the progress made toward long-lasting peace and stability (Edwards et al, 2015). This paper applies a theory of conflict mitigation to derive predictions about the impact of partial decentralization on post-conflict stability in Sierra Leone.…”

Impact of Recent Changes on Local Government Discretion and Accountability in Turkey

“…Other case studies analysing the impact of accountability and discretion linkages to broader local governance outcomes include Kerala, India (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009), Ghana , Philippines (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2013), Burkina Faso (Mahieu and Yilmaz, 2010), Tanzania , Ethiopia (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2011), Pakistan (Aslam and Yilmaz, 2011), Turkey (Yilmaz and Guner 2013), and Sierra Leone (Edwards, Yilmaz and Boex, 2015). They aimed at separation of the executive arm of the SPAs from its deliberative arm.…”