Summary Sierra Leone has made progress in recovering from a decade‐long civil war, in part due to decentralization. As a post‐conflict stabilization strategy, decentralization has been effective in satisfying the desire for more equitable political representation, and three rounds of peaceful elections have strengthened democratic norms. However, more needs to be performed to strengthen local governments in order to address regional horizontal inequity. Solely political decentralization is not sufficient in addressing regional differences in pro‐poor service delivery, which was a key driver of conflict. It requires broader commitment to establish a functioning local government system, including central government subscription to the tenets of administrative and fiscal decentralization. Though Sierra Leone has remained stable in terms of political violence, recent data show that the nation has not made great strides in addressing weak and inequitable social service delivery. This paper argues that this stagnation is a product of the incomplete nature of the post‐conflict stabilization strategy of decentralization and that correcting this failure will require strong commitment from the central government to implementing the full measure of the existing legal framework for decentralization. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Summary Sierra Leone's experience with decentralization as a post‐conflict stabilization tool highlights both the value of making and keeping a promise to empower citizens through local government and the importance of fully implementing that promise over a longer time horizon. The emergence of the country from civil conflict into peace and stability is one of the greatest success stories of post‐conflict stabilization. Although the nation has enjoyed over a decade of peace (and peaceful transitions from party to party), many of the conditions that laid the groundwork for conflict remain, especially in rural areas, due to the partial implementation of the decentralization framework. Based on a post‐conflict perspective, we review the re‐emergence of local governments in Sierra Leone following the civil war, the institutional and legal framework within which they exist, and some of the remaining challenges the nation faces. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The financial services industry indirectly regulates itself through littlediscussed, scandal-prone, and structurally-entrenched self-regulatory organizations. FINRA, the most prominent of these self-regulatory organizations, makes regulations and sets enforcement policy that directly affect public welfare.As with other self-regulatory organizations, FINRA's structure poses a continual risk that industry members will subvert its processes to act like a cartel, promoting industry interests at the expense of the public and contributing to the excessive rents collected by financial intermediaries. Although this dark side to self-regulation poses a constant danger, structural reforms may increase the likelihood that FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations will take the public's interests into account. While others have discussed how self-regulatory organizations increasingly resemble afifth branch of the federal government, this article shifts the focus to how the public actually exercises its voice within FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations. This Article examines the purportedly public representatives serving on FINRA's Board of Governors.It finds that these public representatives often simultaneously serve on the boards of corporate financial intermediaries, giving rise to conflicts of interest between loyalties to market participants and industry lobbying groups and their roles as protectors of the public interest. To amplify the public's voice within these organizations, this Article proposes a different appointment process for the public representatives serving within self-regulatory organizations and calls for increased transparency and improved oversight.

There is an extensive literature on the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, development, and public sector effectiveness. However, the empirical literature on fiscal decentralization has exclusively focused on measuring the finances of elected or ''devolved'' local governments. Other types of decentralized expenditures, including deconcentrated and delegated expenditures, have been systematically excluded from measurement and analysis in the public finance and development literature. Our analysis considers the extent to which using devolved expenditures as a proxy for all devolved expenditures may have impacted the findings of the empirical literature. We collect comprehensive vertical expenditure profiles for health and education services in twenty-nine developing and transition

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