Decentralized Rent-Seeking in Iraq's Post-ISIS Economy: A Warning from the Concrete Block Industry

DeWeaver, Mark A.

doi:10.26598/auis_iris_2017_08_23

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 3 publications

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“…According to a high-ranking Shiʿa Turkman official in Tuz, AAH's 'economic committee' has been using employees within various service offices to collect taxes from all types of businesses including shops, private clinics, restaurants and block factories. (50) In addition to cash collected at checkpoints along strategic commercial roads, 51 this money is in turn used to purchase the influence that the mayor himself lacks. (52) The periods of intercommunal violence are still fresh on the residents' minds.…”

Section: Map (3) Iraq's Salahaddin Governoratementioning

confidence: 99%

Actors, Conflict, and Comeptition in Iraq’s Disputed Territories After the Islamic State: The Cases of Northren Diyala and Eastern Salahaddin

2019

jopss

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This article examines the emerging security, political, and economic dynamics in Iraq’s Internally Disputed Boundaries (DIBs) following the defeat of Islamic State (IS) and the withdrawal of the Kurdish security forces from those areas. The research focuses on two vital but unappreciated areas of the DIBs: Tuz Khurmatu and northern Diyala. As the vast majority of the media and policy attention is directed towards either Kirkuk, due to oil interests, or the Nineveh Plains, due to the presence of vulnerable ethnic minorities, the other centres of the DIBs receive insufficient consideration among scholars, policy makers and development practitioners. Some NGOs have gone so far as to make a policy of avoiding Tuz and northern Diyala altogether due to the difficulty of local conditions and the ever-present potential for violence. This is a grave error. The DIBs cannot be resolved without engaging these two regions, as they are strategically important for commercial and political reasons, and any final deal on the status of the DIBs between Baghdad and Erbil will have to include them.

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Section: Map (3) Iraq's Salahaddin Governoratementioning

confidence: 99%

Actors, Conflict, and Comeptition in Iraq’s Disputed Territories After the Islamic State: The Cases of Northren Diyala and Eastern Salahaddin

2019

jopss

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Compatibility of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s Institutions and Economic Development Within Iraq

Sümer

Joseph

2018

Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations

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Public Sector Reforms in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Tackling the Socially Constructed Barriers to Change

Joseph

Sümer

2018

Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations

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Decentralized Rent-Seeking in Iraq's Post-ISIS Economy: A Warning from the Concrete Block Industry

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

Actors, Conflict, and Comeptition in Iraq’s Disputed Territories After the Islamic State: The Cases of Northren Diyala and Eastern Salahaddin

Actors, Conflict, and Comeptition in Iraq’s Disputed Territories After the Islamic State: The Cases of Northren Diyala and Eastern Salahaddin

Compatibility of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s Institutions and Economic Development Within Iraq

Public Sector Reforms in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Tackling the Socially Constructed Barriers to Change

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