Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America

Abstract

The conclusion of the Cold War and the re-emergence of democracy in South America has removed principal enemies, both internal and external, while economic integration has softened contentious border disputes. This changed environment has led the military to rethink its role and search for new missions. While many purportedly `new' missions were not unheard of in the past, they have recently taken on greater importance. Are some of these activities intrinsically more detrimental than others for the development of civilian control over the military? Most scholars have customarily thought so, assuming that internal, role expansive operations would allow the armed forces undue political influence and erode the base of civilian supremacy. In our examination of 23 missions and 33 operations across 7 South America countries, we find sufficient grounds to question these assumptions. The evidence suggests that the character of the military mission alone does not dictate the fate of civilian control. Rather, only by revealing the principal decision-makers behind the military campaigns can we assess the longer-term impact of military activity upon political overseers.

Military Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis in Latin America: Military Presence, Autonomy, and Human Rights Violations

“…All nations entered the 2020 pandemic with some preset degree of military political autonomy, based on historical precedents, legacies of military power following departures from authoritarian rule, and negotiated settlements once democracies regained their footing ( Agüero, 1995 ). At stake is how much influence militaries bring with them at the outset of a pandemic and over how wide a range of policy matters ( Pion-Berlin & Arceneaux, 2000 ). Militaries that have enjoyed histories of high political autonomy and power could be in a position to also command the pandemic operations on the ground.…”

“…Operational autonomy refers to the ability of the military to take charge of a specific operation, as distinct from an entire mission, let alone an entire policy sphere ( Pion-Berlin & Arceneaux, 2000 ). While general parameters for conduct may be set by political and ministerial authorities, commanders on the ground can be given or perhaps demand some discretion to shape the nature of the operation and to determine how specific tasks are executed.…”

Latin America in Times of Turbulence

“…The fact that most militaries did not exploit the pandemic to seek additional institutional autonomy is also noteworthy. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (2000) argue that the impact of internal military missions on civilian control hinges on three questions: (1) the existence of capable civilian organizations to fulfil the operation, (2) the willingness of military officials to relinquish control when a civilian organization exists, and (3) the creation of an alternative civilian organization to carry out the action in the future. As a result, they find that role expansion in the 1990s did not lead to increased military autonomy in Brazil or Argentina when presidents enlisted the military's help in distributing food or providing health services.…”

Fundamentos Olvidados de la Política de Defensa: Reflexiones a partir del Caso Argentino

“…Finalmente, es un concepto disputado en el sentido de que no existe una definición neutral, su orientación tiene efectos sobre la percepción de amenaza de los estados, las misiones de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad, los recursos que destinan a ellas, como se entrenan o el armamento que adquieren, entre otros aspectos (Frederic, 2011;Arceneaux, 2000).…”