Over time, the Organization of American States has become institutionally and normatively more capable of defending democracy in the region. Yet the OAS is as selective in its interventions on behalf of democratic promotion today as it was in the early 1990s. To explain this puzzle, this study disaggregates democratic dilemmas according to issue areas, threats, and contingencies. It finds that the OAS responds more forcefully when the problem presents a clear and present danger both to the offending state and to other members. As threats become weaker or more ambiguous, the OAS tends to act more timidly, unless domestic constituencies cry out for its assistance or the United States puts its full weight behind the effort. Case study capsules provide empirical evidence to illustrate these arguments.

Over time, the Organization of American States has become institutionally and normatively more capable of defending democracy in the region. Yet the OAS is as selective in its interventions on behalf of democratic promotion today as it was in the early 1990s. To explain this puzzle, this study disaggregates democratic dilemmas according to issue areas, threats, and contingencies. It finds that the OAS responds more forcefully when the problem presents a clear and present danger both to the offending state and to other members. As threats become weaker or more ambiguous, the OAS tends to act more timidly, unless domestic constituencies cry out for its assistance or the United States puts its full weight behind the effort. Case study capsules provide empirical evidence to illustrate these arguments.

The conclusion of the Cold War and the re-emergence of democracy in South America has removed principal enemies, both internal and external, while economic integration has softened contentious border disputes. This changed environment has led the military to rethink its role and search for new missions. While many purportedly `new' missions were not unheard of in the past, they have recently taken on greater importance. Are some of these activities intrinsically more detrimental than others for the development of civilian control over the military? Most scholars have customarily thought so, assuming that internal, role expansive operations would allow the armed forces undue political influence and erode the base of civilian supremacy. In our examination of 23 missions and 33 operations across 7 South America countries, we find sufficient grounds to question these assumptions. The evidence suggests that the character of the military mission alone does not dictate the fate of civilian control. Rather, only by revealing the principal decision-makers behind the military campaigns can we assess the longer-term impact of military activity upon political overseers.

No abstract

No abstract