Decisions on Remanufacturing with WTP Disparity and Recycling Competition under Government Subsidies

Abstract

Abstract:Enterprises have assigned increasing importance to remanufacturing, and meanwhile, the competitiveness of remanufacturing has also become established. In this article, game theory is exploited and government subsidies for remanufacturing, consumer willingness to pay and recycling competition are considered, with a focus on a supply chain consisting of one local manufacturer and one nonlocal remanufacturer. This study attempts to investigate how nonlocal remanufacturers and local manufacturers determine whether they recycle used products and engage in remanufacturing when these factors are considered, in the hope that the results can be constructive in terms of policies and management related to enterprises and governments. As such, four situations are considered and the corresponding models are built to derive the optimal production of each enterprise in the four different situations. Numerical results under the four situations are furthercompared. The results show that consumer acceptance of remanufactured products, irrespective of whether there is competition in production and recycling of remanufactured products and whetherthe government provides subsidy for remanufacturing directly affects each enterprise, remanufacturing and the profits of the overall supply chains. Based on these factors, enterprises should adjust strategies and choose to compete or stop competing or monopolize the market. The government should define attitudes towards the market competition and supervise the changes of market competitiveness based onmarket competition and consumer acceptance of remanufactured products. This study can provide some constructive guidance for some potential nonlocal enterprises engaged in remanufacturing, and at the same time shed some light for desirable direction in some further research onremanufacturing in theory and practice.

Decisions of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Double Policy Considering Remanufacturing

“…Li et al [18] issues the role of subsidy policy in social welfare, and finds that the subsidy may be ineffective, and the reason for this phenomenon is analyzed as well. Shu et al [19], considering the consumer willingness to pay and the competition to recycle, investigates the influence of government subsidies on recycling used products and engaging in remanufacturing for local manufacturers and nonlocal manufacturers. Fu et al [20] compares the linear subsidy model and the fixed subsidy model, and explores the impacts of different subsiding policies on consumer surplus and social welfare.…”

Collection and Remanufacturing of Waste Products under Patent Protection and Government Regulation

“…A single-stage game among supply chain members is discussed without regard for product life cycle, which would requires dynamic game analyses. We consider that the single period of games between the CLSC and the government is profound enough to illustrate the problem and acquire sufficient conclusions [39,40].…”

Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors

“…Zhao et al [26] explore the effects of consumers' environmental preference and government subsidy policy on remanufacturing. Shu et al [27] study the effect of government subsidies for remanufacturing in a supply chain consisting of a local and nonlocal remanufacturer. From the perspective of the whole product life cycle, Chang et al [28] study the impact of Chinese recycling subsidy policy on environmental pollution and social welfare.…”