Decoding codes: The dialogue between consumers and suppliers through codes of conduct in the European Community

Industry Self‐Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

“…For example, Huyse and Parmentier (1990) distinguish between subcontracting (where the state limits itself to setting the formal conditions for rule making while leaving it entirely up to the parties to shape the content), concerted action (where the state not only sets the formal, but also the substantive conditions for rule making by one or more parties) and incorporation (where existing, but non-official norms become part of the legislative order by insertion into statutes or by declaring the product of private negotiations generally binding for a whole sector) (ibid. : 260).…”

Multi-Stakeholder Labour Monitoring Organizations: Egoists, Instrumentalists, or Moralists?

“…12 In this arrangement buyers that have implemented the CIP ''must give preference to suppliers who are SA8000 applicants and publicly report how many of their suppliers have achieved SA8000 applicant status'' (http://www.sa-intl.org/) 13 Although O'Rourke (Unpublished manuscript) claimed that WRAP and FLA have accredited PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and the Maquila Solidarity Network (2002) claimed that the FLA accredited GSC, it no longer seems to be the case that FLA and WRAP continue to accredit these organizations. 14 The Guatemalan branch of PricewaterhouseCoopers, however, is still currently one of WRAP's accredited monitors 15 For a discussion of the different types of codes of conduct, see Huyse and Parmentier (1990). 16 For a discussion and analysis of the rise of voluntary labour standards, which is the type of code specifically examined in this article, as well as the rise of monitoring in the apparel industry, see Bartley (2005).…”

Friends, Enemies, or Strangers? On Relationships between Public and Private Sector Service Providers in Hybrid Forms of Governance

“…A. EXISTING TYPOLOGIES Following contemporary forms of governance, regulatory scholars have introduced a wide range of "grand ideas" to describe and analyze hybrids such as quasi-market arrangements (LeGrand and Bartlett 1993), publicprivate partnerships (Hodge and Greve 2007), incorporation and concerted action (Huyse and Parmentier 1990), covenants and contracting (Van den Heuvel 1994), and a range of self-regulatory initiatives, such as co-regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998), enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), sanctioned self-regulation and coerced self-regulation (Price and Verhulst 2005), or mandated self-regulation and mandatory (May 2007;Adams and Evans 2004) van der Heijden FRIENDS, ENEMIES, OR STRANGERS? 369 partial self-regulation (Rees 1988).…”

“…Following contemporary forms of governance, regulatory scholars have introduced a wide range of “grand ideas” to describe and analyze hybrids such as quasi‐market arrangements (LeGrand and Bartlett 1993), public–private partnerships (Hodge and Greve 2007), incorporation and concerted action (Huyse and Parmentier 1990), covenants and contracting (Van den Heuvel 1994), and a range of self‐regulatory initiatives, such as co‐regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998), enforced self‐regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), sanctioned self‐regulation and coerced self‐regulation (Price and Verhulst 2005), or mandated self‐regulation and mandatory partial self‐regulation (Rees 1988). Although these scholars might be said to play a “language game” (Hodge and Greve 2007, 547–48), a close analysis of their work reveals that they refer to truly different hybrids, which are typified by the “amount” of public and private sector involvement in a hybrid (cf.…”