Decomposition and analysis in frege’s<i>grundgesetze</i>

Landini, Gregory

doi:10.1080/01445349608837260

Cited by 10 publications

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“…Elsewhere, Klement (2010, p. 177) is clear about the Fregean syntax. Landini (1996) also thinks that Fregean senses have unique analysis into parts extractable from their syntactic presentation. This might suggest that names of Begriffsschrift in Landini's account have a unique syntactic derivation.…”

Section: Against Same Corresponding Constituentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Functional Composition of Sense

Pickel

2021

Synthese

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A central dispute in understanding Frege’s philosophy concerns how the sense of a complex expression relates to the senses of its component expressions. According to one reading, the sense of a complex expression is a whole built from the senses of the component expressions. On this interpretation, Frege is an early proponent of structured propositions. A rival reading says that senses compose by functional application: the sense of a complex expression is the value of the function denoted by its functional component for the arguments denoted by its remaining components. I argue that two non-negotiable Fregean theses entail that senses compose by functional application. One thesis is that referents compose by functional application. The other thesis is that an expression in an indirect context refers to its customary sense.

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Section: Against Same Corresponding Constituentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Functional Composition of Sense

Pickel

2021

Synthese

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“…To see this, consider Blanchette's detailed-and to my mind correct-account of how Frege's intended analysis is meant to transform an arithmetical truth into a logical truth. 43 She convincingly shows how Frege's intended analysis involves an appeal to (a version of) basic law V. That is, in order to arrive at a logical identity (analysans) which is meant to capture the very thought expressed 41 Compare here also (Landini, 1996) who offers numerous convincing examples of logical identities that are not synonymous. Indeed, as one referee pointed out, one may raise doubts about a potential synonymy claim with respect to another basic law, namely basic law VI: a = Kε(a = ε)…”

Section: Blv Synonymy: From Function Und Begriff To Grundgesetzementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The metaphors used above appear in his "Logik in der Mathematik" (1914) in(Frege, 1983) and play an important role in(Burge, 1984;Burge, 1990),(Jeshion, 2001), and(Nelson, 2008). However, compare here my footnote 8.37 See, in particular(Dummett, 1991c), p.176,(Dummett, 1989) (Landini, 1996),(Klement, 2002). and(Heck and May, 2011) develop interpretations of Fregean senses on which [BLV Synonymy] is false.…”

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confidence: 98%

“…7 (Dummett, 1991c), chapter 14, (Klement, 2002), and (Landini, 1996) who also maintains that provided identity of content requires more than provable equivalence, Frege never adopted [Abstraction Synonymy] in any period.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…14 Landini is the most notable exception here. He offers independent reasons to reject [Abstraction Synonymy] and [BLV Synonymy] as suitable interpretations of Frege's work in (Landini, 1996) and more recently in his monograph (Landini, 2012).…”

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Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis

Ebert

2015

Philosophia Mathematica

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Introduction: An incompatible triad Frege's Logicism has been subject to a variety of different interpretations. The following three thesis have individually been associated with key aspects of Frege's philosophy, yet they are jointly incompatible: Informativeness Arithmetical identity statements are informative because the senses of the expressions flanking the identity sign are distinct. Analysis Arithmetical identity statements are analysable into logical identity statements by providing (term by term) sense-preserving analyses. Logical Identity Logical identity statements are logically true in virtue of an identity of senses of the expressions flanking the identity. The three claims constitute an incompatible triad: [Informativeness] requires that the expressions flanking an informative arithmetical identity are distinct. According to [Analysis], there is a corresponding logical identity which properly captures the senses of the original arithmetical expressions. Yet, given [Logical Identity], the relevant logical identity will be such that the two sides flanking the identity sign express the same sense. Something, it seems, has to go. 1 Given that there is little doubt amongst Frege scholars that Frege was indeed committed to [Informativeness], the two natural avenues to resolve the

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Russell and Frege on the Power of Symbols and the Compositionality of Linguistic Expressions

Garavaso

2018

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

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Decomposition and analysis in frege’sgrundgesetze

Cited by 10 publications

References 10 publications

The Functional Composition of Sense

The Functional Composition of Sense

Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis

Russell and Frege on the Power of Symbols and the Compositionality of Linguistic Expressions

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