We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial field of consciousness (FoC) is structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory and frames them by selecting points of view and perspectives according to preferences. The choice of projective frames governs how expectations are transformed by consciousness. Violations of expectation are encoded as free energy. Free energy minimization drives perspective taking, and controls the switch between perception, imagination and action. In the PCM, consciousness functions as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can account for a variety of psychological phenomena: the characteristic spatial phenomenology of subjective experience, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination and action, the role of affective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the dynamics of bistable figures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to function, showing the computational advantages of consciousness. It suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious to conscious reflect the action of projective transformations and suggests specific neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing artificial systems, and formal principles for psychology.

It has been proposed that self-awareness (SA), a multifaceted phenomenon central to human consciousness, depends critically on specific brain regions, namely the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Such a proposal predicts that damage to these regions should disrupt or even abolish SA. We tested this prediction in a rare neurological patient with extensive bilateral brain damage encompassing the insula, ACC, mPFC, and the medial temporal lobes. In spite of severe amnesia, which partially affected his “autobiographical self”, the patient's SA remained fundamentally intact. His Core SA, including basic self-recognition and sense of self-agency, was preserved. His Extended SA and Introspective SA were also largely intact, as he has a stable self-concept and intact higher-order metacognitive abilities. The results suggest that the insular cortex, ACC and mPFC are not required for most aspects of SA. Our findings are compatible with the hypothesis that SA is likely to emerge from more distributed interactions among brain networks including those in the brainstem, thalamus, and posteromedial cortices.

Part I: The "Paradoxes" of Subjectivity I. IntroductoryWe use 'paradox' here loosely. We intend not genuine contradictions but aspects of consciousness that are familiar but difficult to model. The two main "paradoxes" of subjectivity to preoccupy us are these: First, the "subject" of consciousness-that to which the world appears-is elusive, so much so that some (e.g., Hume) have concluded that there is no such thing; and yet there is a stubborn intuition that we are immediately aware that the world appears to us and that consciousness has a 'for-me' aspect (Levine 2001) and not merely a 'what-it-is-like' aspect. Second, consciousness seems to involve a sort of duality within unity, an observer-observed. We offer a model that can resolve these and other "paradoxes" naturally. Our general approach, which is by no means unique to us, is threefold:(1) We begin with phenomenological descriptions of the relevant data, in this case, the structures of subjectivity. (2) We find a mathematical framework that gives us a coherent model of the structures as described.(3) We seek to develop an empirical framework that would allow us to assess whether the key features of the model non-trivially correlate with neural processes and structures already plausibly identified as being closely related to consciousness.In this paper we will confine ourselves to 1 and 2.

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<p>The years since the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus have produced a good many interpretations of its central tenets. Time has produced something of a consensus concerning the nature of the Tractarian criticisms of Russell's philosophy. Recent work on Russell's philosophy of logic reveals, however, that the agreed account of Tractarian criticisms relies upon characterizing Russell with positions he did not hold.</p>