Default Positions: What Shapes Public Attitudes about International Debt Disputes?

Abstract

This article examines public opinion toward sovereign debt disputes. Using evidence from multiple surveys fielded in Argentina-the country at the center of the most prominent legal dispute with foreign bondholders-we examine the sources of public support for debt repayment. Our evidence shows that economic self-interest and competing issue frames have little impact on attitudes toward debt repayment in Argentina. Individuals' opinions toward debt disputes are driven primarily by their longstanding symbolic attitudes. In particular, partisan identity and Presidential approval are the strongest predictors of attitudes toward debt repayment. We also show that partisanship has particularly strong effects for well-informed voters and in periods marked by abundant information about elite positions on this issue. This supports elite cueing theories of public opinion. These findings may help explain why some governments refuse to settle economically costly disputes with their external creditors. Forthcoming in International Studies QuarterlyAcknowledgments: The authors' names are listed in alphabetical order. We thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of this journal for their close readings and helpful comments on this article, and we also thank

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