Defeasible normative reasoning

Spohn, Wolfgang

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02083-2

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…6 An exhaustive treatment of the will operator would require the construction of its precise semantics, capable of defining the deontic concept of optimality. Here we refer back to technical treatises such Kutschera (1982), pp. 1-28, Corradini (1989), pp.…”

Section: Notion Of Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bayesian Practical Inference

Corradini

Galvan

2023

Found Sci

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In this essay, we will try to provide a formal analysis of practical inference, attentive to the various phases in which it is articulated, and being so capable of explaining both the logical conclusiveness of the inference and the probabilistic nature of its conclusion. An innovative purpose of this article is to show how the final deliberation leading to action—the ultimate practical judgment—takes place according to a logic consistent with the use of Bayes’ theorem. This is why we refer to Bayesian practical inference in the title of this essay.

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Section: Notion Of Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This fact also leads many authors to maintain that practical inference is a defeasible non-monotonic form of inference. See for exampleSpohn (2019). The theme is also present in authors sensitive to the treatment of practical inference in medieval practical philosophy.…”

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confidence: 99%

Bayesian Practical Inference

Corradini

Galvan

2023

Found Sci

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“…Of course, this anticipates a robust theory of rational qualitative deliberation that is not immediately forthcoming. However, recent work such as Lin (2013) and Spohn (2017Spohn ( , 2019 may remedy that inadequacy. For example, Lin (2013) proves a Savage-style representation theorem characterizing the relationship between full beliefs, desires over possible outcomes, and preferences over acts.…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, recent work such asLin (2013) andSpohn (2017Spohn ( , 2019 may remedy that inadequacy in the case of qualitative belief.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy? Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home town?1 I understand decision-making under 'uncertainty' here to refer to any case where an agent is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where 'risk' refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, 'uncertainty' refers to the case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in a state of 'ignorance' if she cannot make such probability assignments, and 'ambiguity' occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory's treatment of risk aversion. 13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is sometimes referred to as a theory of decision-making under risk, and Savage's is referred to as a theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above, von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory can also be applied when probabilities are subjective.49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988). 50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.

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“…The first of the two articles on the "is-ought problem" in this special issue is written by Wolfgang Spohn, entitled "Defeasible Normative Reasoning" (Spohn 2018), and briefly discusses three bridge principles between is and ought statements studied in Gerhard's (1997). The article then focuses on the means-end principle and suggests to replace Gerhard's version of that principle by a subjunctive reading which he takes as a starting point for his paper.…”

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Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

et al. 2019

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This special issue of Synthese is in honor of Gerhard Schurz, our good friend and colleague, who contributed to philosophy in a multitude of novel and interesting ways. The idea to do such a special issue was born at a symposium on the occasion of Gerhard's 60th birthday back then in 2016. As a fun fact, the final publication of the special issue in print might be quite close to his 65th birthday in 2021. So in some sense this special issue can be expected to kill two birds with one stone. Let us start this introduction with a few words on Gerhard's life and work and on the guest editors' own relationship to him. We then zoom in and will say more about this special issue, followed by a brief description of its content.

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Defeasible normative reasoning

Cited by 6 publications

References 36 publications

Bayesian Practical Inference

Bayesian Practical Inference

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”

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