Defeasible security policy composition for web services

Lee, Adam J.; Boyer, J.P.; Olson, Lars E.; Gunter, Carl A.

doi:10.1145/1180337.1180342

Cited by 32 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…A hierarchy of pairs of access lists is created; a firewall policy is assembled by forming a single access list from the pairs along a path in the hierarchy from a leaf to the root. Another example is in the policy language of Lee et al [18].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access-Control Policies via Belnap Logic: Effective and Efficient Composition and Analysis

Bruns¹,

Huth

2008

2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

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It is difficult to develop and manage large, multi-author access control policies without a means to compose larger policies from smaller ones. Ideally, an access-control policy language will have a small set of simple policy combinators that allow for all desired policy compositions. In [5], a policy language was presented having policy combinators based on Belnap logic, a four-valued logic in which truth values correspond to policy results of "grant", "deny", "conflict", and "undefined". We show here how policies in this language can be analyzed, and study the expressiveness of the language. To support policy analysis, we define a query language in which policy analysis questions can be phrased. Queries can be translated into a fragment of first-order logic for which satisfiability and validity checks are computable by SAT solvers or BDDs. We show how policy analysis can then be carried out through model checking, validity checking, and assume-guarantee reasoning over such translated queries. We also present static analysis methods for the particular questions of whether policies contain gaps or conflicts. Finally, we establish expressiveness results showing that all data independent policies can be expressed in our policy language.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access-Control Policies via Belnap Logic: Effective and Efficient Composition and Analysis

Bruns¹,

Huth

2008

2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

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“…The default property can be used to express default rules such as an access is denied unless explicitly is authorized. Lee et al [26] use defeasible logic to represent and compose policies for web services. They state that using defeasible rules simplify the composition of policies and can be fully automated.…”

Section: Related Work and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A temporal defeasible logic for handling access control policies

Sabri

Obeid

2015

Appl Intell

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Access control policies are specified within systems to ensure confidentiality of their information. Available knowledge about policies is usually incomplete and uncertain. An essential goal in reasoning is to reach conclusions which can be justified. However, since justification does not necessarily guarantee truth, the best we can do is to derive "plausible/ tentative" conclusions from partial and conflicting information. Policies are typically expressed as rules that could be complex and include timing constraints. Complex sets of access policies can contain conflicts e.g., a rule allows access while another rule prevents it. In this paper, we aim at providing a formalism for specifying authorization policies of a dynamic system. We present a temporal defeasible logic (TDL) which allows us to specify temporal policies and to handle conflicts. It can be shown that the proposed model is a generalization of the role-based access control model.

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“…Especially in the area of web service composition, the composition of security policies plays an important role, as different policies have to be combined for every combination of web services (e.g. [23], [24]). We adopt some of these concepts into our distributed CEP system, which allows us to inherit access restrictions during the different processing steps in the operators of our system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access Policy Consolidation for Event Processing Systems

Schilling

Koldehofe

Rotherme³

et al. 2013

2013 Conference on Networked Systems

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Current event processing systems lack methods to preserve privacy constraints of incoming event streams in a chain of subsequently applied stream operations. This is a problem in large-scale distributed applications like a logistic chain where event processing operators may be spread over multiple security domains. An adversary can infer from legally received outgoing event streams confidential input streams of the event processing system. This paper presents a finegrained access management for complex event processing. Each incoming event stream can be protected by the specification of an access policy and is enforced by algorithms for access consolidation. The utility of the event processing system is increased by providing and computing in a scalable manner a measure for the obfuscation of event streams. An obfuscation threshold as part of the access policy allows to ignore access requirements and deliver events which have achieved a sufficient high obfuscation level.

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Defeasible security policy composition for web services

Cited by 32 publications

References 19 publications

Access-Control Policies via Belnap Logic: Effective and Efficient Composition and Analysis

Access-Control Policies via Belnap Logic: Effective and Efficient Composition and Analysis

A temporal defeasible logic for handling access control policies

Access Policy Consolidation for Event Processing Systems

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