Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties

Bone, Jonathan E.; Silva, Antonio S.; Raihani, Nichola

doi:10.1098/rsbl.2014.0388

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In reality, imposing a larger cost on another individual is likely to also impose a larger cost on the punisher (Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012a). Since punishers have been shown to adjust their investment according to the costs associated with punishment (Anderson & Putterman, 2006;Bone, Silva, & Raihani, 2014;Carpenter, 2007;Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008;Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992), this creates a potentially important trade-off between maximizing income and achieving the desired punishment outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Bone

Raihani

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

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Humans willingly pay a cost to punish defecting partners in experimental games. However, the psychological motives underpinning punishment are unclear. Punishment could stem from the desire to reciprocally harm a cheat (i.e. revenge) which is arguably indicative of a deterrent function. Alternatively, punishment could be motivated by the desire to redress the balance between punisher and cheat. Such a desire for equality might be more indicative of a fitness-leveling function. We used a two player experimental game to disentangle these two possibilities. In this game, one player could choose to steal $0.20 from their partner. Depending on the treatment, players interacting with a stealing partner experienced either advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or disadvantageous inequality. Players could punish stealing partners but some players had access to effective punishment (1 : 3 fee to fine) whereas others could only use ineffective punishment (1 : 1). Players who had access to effective punishment could reduce disadvantageous inequality by tailoring their investment in punishment whereas ineffective punishment did not change the relative payoffs of the individuals in the game but could be used to exact revenge. Players punished regardless of whether stealing created outcome inequality or whether punishment was ineffective at removing payoff differentials, suggesting that punishment was at least partly motivated by the desire to inflict reciprocal harm. However, in the effective punishment condition, players' tendency to punish increased if stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality and, when possible, punishers tailored their investment in punishment to create equal outcomes. Together these findings suggest that punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. The implications of these findings are discussed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Bone

Raihani

2015

Evolution and Human Behavior

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“…In addition to the well-known and important adverse effects that emerge if cooperators are sanctioned [38,39], some indi- * Electronic address: xiaojiechen@uestc.edu.cn viduals in the group may act emotionally and exploit options related to within-group enforcement [32,[40][41][42], for example resorting to probabilistic peer punishment [43]. It is thus also of interest to consider whether the addition of probabilistic within-group enforcement can further enhance the evolution of cooperation in the presence of monitoring and implicated punishment.…”

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confidence: 99%

Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement

Chen

Sasaki

Perc

2015

Sci Rep

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Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.

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“…Other studies have also shown that excessive generosity is judged unfavourably and may even be punished (148)(149)(150). By contrast, antisocial punishment of overly cooperative individuals is rare when the punisher is a third-party, rather than a player who was involved in the public goods game (151). Since the third-party cannot contribute to the public good, their reputation as a generous or cooperative individual is not affected by the investments of the other players.…”

Section: (Ii) Observers Infer That Helping Behaviour Is Detrimental To Themmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour

Raihani¹

2021

Preprint

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Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. But investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (i) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (ii) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures – and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

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Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties

Cited by 9 publications

References 26 publications

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality

Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour

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