2021 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Circuits and Systems (ICCS) 2021
DOI: 10.1109/iccs52645.2021.9697251
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Defending against Thermal Covert Channel Attacks by Task Migration in Many-core System

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2022
2022
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4
2

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 29 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In [7], DVFS is applied to the cores that have a TCC transceiver to shut down any data transmission right from the source. Another countermeasure approach in [14] tries to separate the identified transmitter and receiver farther apart from each other through task migration. Since thermal signals decay very fast with respect to distance, the BER of TCC becomes unacceptably high when the distance between the cores running the transmitter and the receiver is beyond a few hops.…”
Section: B Tcc Detection Methods and Coutermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [7], DVFS is applied to the cores that have a TCC transceiver to shut down any data transmission right from the source. Another countermeasure approach in [14] tries to separate the identified transmitter and receiver farther apart from each other through task migration. Since thermal signals decay very fast with respect to distance, the BER of TCC becomes unacceptably high when the distance between the cores running the transmitter and the receiver is beyond a few hops.…”
Section: B Tcc Detection Methods and Coutermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An application running on the receiving core has access to the temperature sensor and reads the encoded temperature profile and decodes the signal to retrieve the secret data [ 37 ]. This type of attack can be accomplished fully remotely since the attacker does not need direct physical access to probe or measure the IC [ 50 ].…”
Section: Types Of Physical Covert Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The app then decodes the temperature profile to retrieve confidential data. The attacker does not need physical access to the system, since the entire attack can be completed remotely [ 37 , 50 ].…”
Section: Covert Channel Attacks In 25d/3d Icsmentioning
confidence: 99%