Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation 2014
DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602834
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Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation

Abstract: Deferred-acceptance auctions choose allocations by an iterative process of rejecting the least attractive bid. These auctions have distinctive computational and incentive properties that make them suitable for application in some challenging environments, such as the planned US auction to repurchase television broadcast rights. For any set of values, any deferred acceptance auction with "threshold pricing"is weakly group strategy-proof, can be implemented using a clock auction, and leads to the same outcome as… Show more

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Cited by 63 publications
(93 citation statements)
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“…Consequently, there has been substantial interest in designing 'simple' mechanisms that perform well, such as deferred-acceptance clock auctions (Milgrom and Segal, 2015) and posted-price mechanisms (Bartal et al, 2003;Feldman et al, 2014;Dütting et al, 2016). These have the (previously unmodeled)…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Consequently, there has been substantial interest in designing 'simple' mechanisms that perform well, such as deferred-acceptance clock auctions (Milgrom and Segal, 2015) and posted-price mechanisms (Bartal et al, 2003;Feldman et al, 2014;Dütting et al, 2016). These have the (previously unmodeled)…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As another example, some wireless spectrum auctions use computationally demanding techniques to solve complex assignment problems, and the auctioneer may not be permitted to publicly disclose all the bids. In these settings, individual bidders may find it difficult and costly to verify the output of the auctioneer's algorithm (Milgrom and Segal, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We start with sufficient conditions that ensure that the double auction is DSIC, resp., has the stronger incentive properties shared by deferred-acceptance implementations [29] (generalizing the Gale-Shapley mechanism [17]). …”
Section: Approach and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Deferred-acceptance algorithms on which part of our work is based are proposed in [29], and their performance is analyzed in [14]. Our work extends the deferred-acceptance framework from one-sided settings to two-sided settings.…”
Section: Further Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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