Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Markakis, Evangelos; Roughgarden, Tim

doi:10.1145/3033274.3085142

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Just as the characterization of DAAs in terms of reverse greedy [25] has given the first extrinsic reason to study the power and limitations of these algorithms [9,16], we believe that our characterization of OSP in terms of two-way greedy will lead to a better understanding of this algorithmic paradigm. In this work, we only began to investigate their power and much more is left to be done.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is achieved with a simple implementation of forward greedy that sweeps through each agent's domain from the best possible type to the worst. Another relevant approach known in the literature is Deferred Acceptance auctions (DAAs) or reverse greedy algorithms [9,16]. These use a (possibly adaptive) (out-)priority function and build a feasible solution by incrementally throwing out the agents whose type is not good enough with respect the current priority (i.e., whose cost (valuation) is higher (lower) than the out-priority) until a feasible solution is found.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Ferraioli¹,

Penna²,

Ventre³

2020

Preprint

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The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced many interesting and valuable contributions in computer science under the general umbrella of algorithmic mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms have been identified and studied in the literature. Our work stems from the observation that selfishness is different from rationality; agents will attempt to strategize whenever they perceive it to be convenient according to their imperfect rationality. Recent work in economics [23] has focused on a particular notion of imperfect rationality, namely absence of contingent reasoning skills, and defined obvious strategyproofness (OSP) as a way to deal with the selfishness of these agents. Essentially, this definition states that to care for the incentives of these agents, we need not only pay attention about the relationship between input and output, but also about the way the algorithm is run. However, it is not clear to date what algorithmic approaches ought to be used for OSP. In this paper, we rather surprisingly show that, for binary allocation problems, OSP is fully captured by a natural combination of two well-known and extensively studied algorithmic techniques: forward and reverse greedy. We call two-way greedy this underdeveloped algorithmic design paradigm.Our main technical contribution establishes the connection between OSP and two-way greedy. We build upon the recently introduced cycle monotonicity technique for OSP [12]. By means of novel structural properties of cycles and queries of OSP mechanisms, we fully characterize these mechanisms in terms of extremal implementations. These are protocols that ask each agent to consistently separate one extreme of their domain at the current history from the rest. Through the natural connection with the greedy paradigm, we are able to import a host of known approximation bounds to OSP and strengthen the strategic properties of this family of algorithms. Finally, we begin exploring the full power of two-way greedy (and, in turns, OSP) in the context of set systems.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Ferraioli¹,

Penna²,

Ventre³

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…[13] proposed a truthful 3 2 -approximate algorithm, when the tasks arrive simultaneously and only their duration is private. In an orthogonal setting, [14] proposed a truthful 4.83-approximation algorithm for weighted completion time minimization, when only the task weights are private.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Online Scheduling of Electric Vehicle Charging Using a Service-Price Menu

Mathioudaki¹,

Τσαούσογλου²,

varvarigos³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Along with high penetration of Electric Vehicles (EVs), charging stations are required to service a large amount of charging requests while accounting for constraints on the station's peak electricity consumption. To this end, a charging station needs to make online charging scheduling decisions often under limited future information. An important challenge relates to the prioritization of EVs that have unknown valuations for different levels of charging services. In this paper, we take into consideration the inability of EV users to express these valuations in closed-form utility functions. We consider a paradigm where a menu of possible charging schedules and corresponding prices is generated online. By letting the EV users pick their most preferable menu option, the proposed algorithm commits on each EV's charging completion time upon its arrival, achieves a near optimal total weighted charging completion time, and prevents the users from strategically misreporting their preferences, while offering a practical and implementable solution to the problem of EVs - charging station interaction.

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“…[14] proposed a truthful 3 2 -approximate algorithm, when the tasks arrive simultaneously and only their duration is private. In an orthogonal setting, [15] proposed a truthful 4.83-approximation algorithm for weighted completion time minimization, when only the task weights are private.…”

Section: B Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Online Scheduling of Electric Vehicle Charging Using a Service-Price Menu

Mathioudaki

Τσαούσογλου

Varvarigos

et al. 2021

2021 International Conference on Smart Energy Systems and Technologies (SEST)

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Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

Cited by 14 publications

References 39 publications

Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality

Efficient Online Scheduling of Electric Vehicle Charging Using a Service-Price Menu

Efficient Online Scheduling of Electric Vehicle Charging Using a Service-Price Menu

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