Delayed Evolutionary Game Dynamics applied to Medium Access Control

2008 6th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks and Workshops

El-Azouzi

Hayel

et al. 2008

Self Cite

Abstract-Evolutionary games have been developed in biological sciences in the aim of studying the evolution and equilibrium behavior (called Evolutionary Stable Strategies -ESS) of large populations. While rich theoretical foundations of evolutionary games allow biologist to explain past and present evolution and predict future evolution, it can be further used in Engineering to architect evolution. In this paper, we apply evolutionary games to non-cooperative networks containing large number of individual non-cooperative terminals or sensors. We study the evolution of congestion control protocols, and show how the evolution and the ESS are influenced by the characteristics of the wireless channel. We then consider the challenge of architecting the evolution: we propose some guidelines for designing a framework that supports evolution of protocols.

Section: Replicator Dynamics With Delaymentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary game approach for the design of congestion control protocols in wireless networks

2008 6th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks and Workshops

El-Azouzi

Hayel

et al. 2008

Self Cite

“…For example, variants of the Hawk-Dove (H-D) game have been successfully applied in networking. The medium access game considers competition over access to a common channel through the control of the attempt probabilities [3]. The power control game studies the choice of transmission power over a collision channel [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such games deal with large populations in which individuals interact with each other through many local interactions, each of which involve two randomly selected individuals. Several previous papers have already studied evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions in the context of wireless networks (see for instance [3], [9], [13]). This pairwise interaction paradigm [10] is relevant for situations of sparse mobile networks in which one may neglect the possibility of simultaneous interference of more than two mobiles.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paradoxes in Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game: When Intuition Fools You!

Haddad

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

Fiems

et al. 2013

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Abstract-This paper studies a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state and balances energy conservation and transmission success. When opting for higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission in the presence of interference increases at the cost of a larger drop in energy. We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non-dynamic strategies: a power level is chosen at start-up and maintained during the lifetime of the battery. A thorough analysis of the existence and characterization of the equilibria of this evolutionary Hawk-Dove game is conducted. Moreover, we study the stability of our results under various classes of evolutionary dynamics, including replicator dynamics and Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics and identify various surprising paradoxes. Simulation results validate our theoretical claims.

“…Variants of the Hawk and Dove (HD) game have found various applications in networking. The medium access game considers competition over the access to a common channel through the control of the attempt probabilities [4]. The power control game studies the choice of transmission power over a collision channel [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semi-dynamic Hawk and Dove game, applied to power control

2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM

Fiems

Haddad

et al. 2012

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Abstract-In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chance of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple nondynamic strategies that consist of choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox in our Hawk-Dove game which we term the initial energy paradox.