Delegative democracy in Russia and Ukraine

Kubiček, Paul

doi:10.1016/0967-067x(94)90006-x

Cited by 58 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Their own appeal is based not on a well-defined program that takes clear positions on different issues, but mostly on their self-proclaimed personal virtues, especially competence, determination, and moral probity, which they depict as decisive for ending the crisis and restoring normalcy. Therefore, personalistic leaders of delegative democracies, like Fujimori, Carlos Menem in Argentina~1989 -1999!, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil~1990-92!, and Boris Yeltsin in Russia~1991-99; see Kubicek, 1994!, are especially exposed to the paradox of success. After ending the deep crisis that allowed them to win office, these chief executives need to bring about economic recovery, promote employment, and combat poverty in order to stabilize their political support.…”

Section: Broader Implications Of the Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori

Weyland

2000

Int Studies Q

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To what extent does a government's success in resolving a deep political and economic crisis strengthen its popular support? The Fujimori administration in Peru, which tackled both profound economic problems and a powerful guerrilla threat, constitutes a useful test case for this important question. Most observers of Peru assume that both Fujimori's success in improving the economy and in combating insurrectionary forces contributed substantially to his high popularity and his reelection victory. Regression analyses of survey and electoral data suggest, however, that the successful counterinsurgency campaign had no significant medium or long-term impact on presidential approval and electoral support. These surprising findings seem to reflect a paradox of success: when a government effectively combats a severe threat, such as rampant guerrilla violence, the salience of the issue diminishes subsequently and people's high appreciation for the president's accomplishment has an ever lower impact on their political attitudes and behavior.How much impact do political and economic crises have on support for the government? Many theories on politics and policy making argue that acute problems reduce the government's political backing, while the solution of such crises greatly strengthens this support. Empirical investigations of this important issue, however~especially analyses of the support that political leaders win by overcoming crises!, have begun to appear only recently. How strong is this effect? And for how long does it last? Does success in overcoming a crisis give support for the government merely a brief, fleeting boost, or does it yield long-lasting, stable backing? Do the people quickly forget a leader's accomplishment and turn their attention to new, still unresolved issues, or do they display enduring gratitude to a "savior"?These questions are of considerable relevance for theories about the political choices of common people and the bases of political leadership. If people rapidly discount a leader's achievements and shift their attention to new issues, it suggests they are constant optimizers who always seek further improvements cf. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1992:598!. By contrast, if people display lasting gratitude to a successful leader and remain fairly content once severe problems are resolved, it suggests they adhere to a logic of "satisficing"~cf. Simon,

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Section: Broader Implications Of the Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori

Weyland

2000

Int Studies Q

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“…To be more concrete, knowing that democratic development was strongly influenced by minimalist procedural definitions and that monitors observed the presence or absence of free and fair elections as the key indicator for democratic development might lead to manipulation of these particular elements in order to make a country be classified as democratic. Political ethnography, by triangulating the results coming from very different, apparently unrelated domains, would not allow such political manipulation of information in order to present a particular political regime as democratic unless there was a corresponding democratic ethic; the presence of procedural elements within a system where there was no choice, political or social, or where the elected politicians use their democratic legitimacy to justify authoritarian behavior (Kubicek 1994), would not qualify the country as democratic.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of European Union Integration in Post-Communist Democratization in Bulgaria and Macedonia

Mitropolitski¹

2013

Canadian Slavonic Papers

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“…Although Yeltsin won the powers he asked for, his victory did not reflect a strong partisan majority Jung-Hsiang, Tsai Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock supporting Yeltsin; no such majority existed (Parish, 1998, 73). Hence, during the reforming process, the parliament locked horns with the strong president, even passing related laws and resolutions to undermine the president's reforms (Kubicek, 1994). The executive-legislative relations reached a serious deadlock.…”

Section: Balance-of-powers Semi-presidentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock

Tsai

2008

Fr Polit

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This article argues that semi-presidentialism can be classified into five sub-types: (1) president-dominant semi-presidentialism, (2) premier-dominant semi-presidentialism, (3) parliament-dominant semi-presidentialism, (4) cohabitation semi-presidentialism, and (5) balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism. This framework differs from previous frameworks by emphasizing the constitutional powers of parliament in tandem with two more standard variables, namely, the powers of the president and the party situation in parliament. On the basis of this framework, it suggests that when two opposing branches (president and parliament) achieve parity, they are more likely to come into conflict as regards the passage of legislation. In particular, it is hypothesized that balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism is much more likely to generate political conflicts and political deadlock than any other subtype, even to the point of breaking down a democratic regime.

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Delegative democracy in Russia and Ukraine

Cited by 58 publications

References 4 publications

A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori

A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori

The Role of European Union Integration in Post-Communist Democratization in Bulgaria and Macedonia

Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock

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