Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The political economy of social protection systems', which is part of a larger research project on 'The economics and politics of taxation and social protection'.
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Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2016Information and requests: publications@wider.unu.edu ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-200-7 Typescript prepared by Sophie Richmond.The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency-providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research.The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, FinlandThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors.Abstract: This paper examines the rise of the social protection agenda in Zambia, and demonstrates that this has two alternative drivers: shifting dynamics within Zambia's political settlement and the promotional efforts of a transnational policy coalition. We compare the cases of social cash transfers and social health insurance to investigate how the interplay of these drivers has shaped the uneven commitment to the respective policies. Social protection has yet to displace existing interests, ideas, and rent-allocation practices. However, cash transfers are gaining localized support. What matters now is the way in which such transfers become integrated within Zambia's distributional regime.