Democracy and diversionary incentives in Japan-South Korea disputes

Kagotani, Koji; Kimura, Kan; Weber, Jeffrey R.

doi:10.1093/irap/lct021

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…McGraw (1990) finds that when dealing with a political predicament, blame shifting allows elites to reframe the problem at hand and win back popular support. For example, during economy hardships, South Korean leaders often lodge diplomatic disputes and criticisms against Japan for historical events to regain public approval (Kagotani et al, 2014). According to this rationale, we compose our first hypothesis:…”

Section: Diversionary Theory Of Weak Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan

Yeh¹,

2020

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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This paper explores the mechanisms and circumstances under which leaders in weak states adopt diversionary behavior to deal with domestic problems. We examine the case of Taiwan to see if its President, Tsai Ingwen, has adopted diversionary behavior from 2016 to the present. We found that, unlike great powers, weak-state leaders often resort to non-force tactics such as blaming foreign opponents, but the emergence of diversionary behavior is conditional on the stability of their relationship with a major power. In the case of Taiwan, Tsai adopted a more confrontational foreign policy toward China only when USA–Taiwan relations had become more stable and more favorable toward Taiwan. Future work could continue to explore the circumstances and tools unique to weak states’ diversionary behavior.

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Section: Diversionary Theory Of Weak Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As with major powers, there is some evidence that leaders in weak states such as Israel (Sprecher and Derouen, 2002), South Korea (Kagotani et al, 2014), and Taiwan (Li et al, 2009) also adopt diversionary behavior. Despite these findings, the literature on diversionary behavior among weak states remains scarce.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan

Yeh¹,

2020

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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“…He ‘chose a different path for Korea, seeking the economic benefits derived from diplomatic relations with Japan despite widespread domestic opposition’ from doing business with the recent colonisers and initiated the cold politics, hot economics dynamic (Jackson, 2011, p. 240). The social and political relationship that has been slowly reconstructed following normalisation in 1965 visibly sours when historical disagreements some to the forefront (Chun, 2015; Gries, Zhang, Masui, & Lee, 2009; Kagotani, Kimura, & Weber, 2014; Kim, 2014; Koga K., 2016). However, similar to Reform and Opening Era China, even when political relations with Japan sour, economic relations continue to expand (Park, 2011).…”

Section: Business–politics Nexus In Northeast Asiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash

Vekasi

Nam

2019

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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Japan has a ‘cold politics, hot economics’ relationship with both China and South Korea where political relations are tense and business overall flourishes. Despite the similarities, the political mobilisation of consumers in response to Japanese business interests diverge: event, trade and tourism data show that South Koreans are less likely to link economic interests with their political grievances with Japan compared to their Chinese counterparts even though the sources of the tensions are largely parallel. The divergence arises from different ways economic globalisation has shaped national identity. In China, economic globalisation has strengthened a nativist identity with strong anti-foreign components. Korean national identity has been formed by economic integration and interdependence. While strong national identity and anti-foreign elements exist, they are delinked from economic interests. Survey and event data from South Korea and China show that the variation in consumer politics is driven by attitudinal differences in the population that is strongly anti-Japanese. Social media data shows how citizens link or delink politics and business to mobilise for collective action and provide qualitative evidence that how identities interact with globalisation explain country-level variation.

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“…Kagotani et al . (2014: 53) argue that ‘economic distress drives South Korea's leaders to direct public attention towards the Japan–South Korea disputes’. Wiegand (2015: 357) suggests that ‘[w]hen domestically vulnerable, Korean leaders have had to balance their policies related to Dokdo with their foreign policies related to Japan, particularly security issues’.…”

Section: The Enigma Of Japan–south Korea Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

It takes two to Tango: the difficult Japan–South Korea relations as clash of realities

Tamaki

2019

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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Why do Japan–South Korea relations remain tense despite repeated efforts to overcome the past? Elite narratives in Japan and South Korea reify the bilateral relationship as a difficult problem. For the Japanese policy elites, the difficulty is due to South Korean unwillingness to embrace a future-oriented relationship; whereas for the South Korean policy elites, the source of the problem is the unwillingness of the Japanese to sincerely address past wrong-doing. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy of an intractable mutual misapprehension, suggesting that the difficult relationship is here to stay. I analyse pronouncements by both the Japanese and South Korean policy elites appearing in official documents and media reports for clues into the manner in which the bilateral relationship is reified into a difficulty purportedly due to the recalcitrance of the neighbour. The narratives consistently show that both the Japanese and South Korean policy elites consider the onus of improvement lies with the troublesome/insincere neighbour. In short, the bilateral relationship is a clash of realities, with the logical conclusion being that the difficult relationship will persist for the foreseeable future.

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Democracy and diversionary incentives in Japan-South Korea disputes

Cited by 13 publications

References 40 publications

Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan

Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan

Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash

It takes two to Tango: the difficult Japan–South Korea relations as clash of realities

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