Democracy, Legitimacy and Local Government Electoral Reform

Evans, Matt

doi:10.1080/03003930.2012.726199

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Israel's governments provide a useful case for studying parties’ coalition behavior for several reasons. First, Israel has a vibrant parliamentary system that has been included in numerous comparative analyses of parties, coalitions, and legislatures (Adams and Merrill ; Browne and Franklin ; Evans ; Laver and Shepsle ; Lijphart ; Martin and Stevenson ; Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge ). Second, similar to the Netherlands, its electoral system has a low threshold and one nationwide voting district, resulting in highly proportional outcomes and coalitions that require multiple partners.…”

Section: Methods Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Evans

2018

Politics & Policy

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Characterizations of political parties as policy‐seeking or office‐seeking have been vague, anecdotal, or theoretical. This research builds on coalition allocation research to develop an empirical determination of parties’ behavior. Through analysis of eight coalition governments in Israel from 1992 to 2015, this work classifies parties based on the degree to which the payoffs they obtain in coalition negotiations are conducive to their policy goals. The results indicate that nonformateur parties tend to be more policy‐seeking and formateur parties more office‐seeking. The research also reveals disparities in proportions of policy‐seeking and office‐seeking payoffs obtained by different types of parties. This work makes several research contributions, including development of an empirical method for identifying parties as policy‐seeking or office‐seeking, broadening allocation analysis to include deputy ministers and committee chairs, and providing a qualitative evaluation of coalition allocation based on the policy value of each payoff for the party obtaining it. Related Articles

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Section: Methods Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Evans

2018

Politics & Policy

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“…Much of the empirical work on city leadership in recent years focuses on the impact of institutional forms and reforms on leadership style (Elcock, 2008;Fenwick and Elcock, 2005;Gains et al, 2007;Greasley and Stoker, 2008;Mouritzen and Svara, 2002;Svara, 2003). In Europe, and particularly the UK, this work has focused on the implications of local government reforms designed to give greater power and authority to local political leaders (Borraz and John, 2004;Evans, 2014). Both Europe and Latin America have seen a growth in the number of cities with elected mayors (Borraz and John, 2004;Montero and Samuels, 2004).…”

Section: Leadership In a Context Of Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Leading cities: a global review of city leadership

Lauermann

2019

European Planning Studies

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“…Examples include Carol Mershon's (1996) Israel, the setting for this study, offers a particularly useful framework to examine the policy salience of coalition payoffs. Its vibrant parliamentary system has been included in numerous comparative analyses of parties, coalitions and legislatures (Adams and Merrill 2009;Browne and Franklin 1973;Evans 2014;Laver and Shepsle 1990;Lijphart 2012;Martin and Stevenson 2001). Additionally, similar to the Netherlands, its low electoral threshold and single nationwide electoral district produce highly proportional outcomes and coalitions that require multiple partners.…”

Section: Study Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing Payoff Salience in Coalition Allocation: Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Committee Chairs

Evans

2018

Gov. & oppos.

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Research during the past six decades has found that parties joining coalition governments receive payoffs, in the form of government posts, in proportion to their coalition share. These findings, however, do not indicate which coalition partners receive payoffs that will most enable them to influence their preferred policies. This article joins recent qualitative analyses of coalition allocation and examines payoffs in terms of the salience of positions relative to the policy goals of the parties receiving them. The single-country study of eight Israeli governments from 1992 to 2015 integrates quantitative and qualitative analyses of coalition payoffs. This article contributes to coalition allocation research by expanding the scope of coalition payoffs to include junior ministers and committee chairs, and by distinguishing payoff outcomes for different party families. The results show an edge for formateur parties in obtaining policy-salient ministerial payoffs and an advantage to non-formateurs for policy-salient deputy (junior) minister positions.

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Democracy, Legitimacy and Local Government Electoral Reform

Cited by 12 publications

References 28 publications

Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Leading cities: a global review of city leadership

Analysing Payoff Salience in Coalition Allocation: Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Committee Chairs

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