Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes Against Islamic State: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Although over sixty partners have joined the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS), only a handful of states was willing to carry out air strikes against IS-targets. This article aims to explain the pattern of democratic participation in the air campaign. It builds on the rich literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the pattern of participation in the air strikes results from a complex interplay between alliance politics, threat perception and domestic institutional constraints. The threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia's immediate vicinity refrained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US' security guarantee. Lastly, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes. On August 7, 2014, the United States launched its first air strikes against the Islamic State (IS). Although "Operation Inherent Resolve" started as a unilateral intervention, the Obama administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of allies as the air campaign intensified. At first glance, its efforts seem very successful: Washington managed to enlist 58 countries as members of the "global coalition to degrade and defeat ISIL" (Allen 2014). However, few allies actually committed military forces to the coalition. At the time of writing (July 2015), only thirteen countries have participated in offensive air operations. In consequence, the United States kept playing a dominant role in the campaign, carrying out the brunt of the air strikes. Many states contributed to the fight against the IS in other ways, for example, by sending arms, ammunition, or military instructors to reinforce Iraqi and Kurdish forces. However, the financial and political costs of these contributions fall far below the burdens involved in participating in combat operations. The latter not only entail more sizeable financial costs, but also a considerable risk of

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Italian Political Parties and Military Operations: An Empirical Analysis on Voting Patterns

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Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh

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