“…In the past decade, a number of democratic theorists have aimed to rehabilitate partisanship as a normative category, and thus account for what ‘good partisanship’ entails in democratic societies (Bonotti, 2012, 2014, 2019; Bonotti et al, 2018; Herman, 2017; Herman and Muirhead, 2020; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein, 2017; Muirhead, 2006, 2014; Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2006; Rosenblum, 2008; Stojanović and Bonotti, 2019; White, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; White and Ypi, 2010, 2011, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2016a, 2016b, 2018, 2019). Against the long-standing belief that partisanship, defined here as an array of discourses and practices in support of a certain vision of the common good attached to partisan identification (Herman, 2017), is necessarily vector of intolerance and division, one of the central contentions of this literature is that partisanship is compatible with a pluralist orientation. At their best, pluralist partisans exert restraint with regard to their own convictions and recognise that there exist other legitimate interpretations of what constitutes the common good than their own.…”