In light of the instability of several Central Eastern European democracies following their accession to the European Union, most dramatically embodied by the ‘constitutional revolution’ taking place in Hungary since April 2010, this paper offers a critical reading of the dominant, rational-institutionalist model of democratic consolidation. Drawing on the Hungarian case, it argues that the conditions set out by this model are insufficient for ensuring a democratic regime against erosion. On this basis, the paper considers additional elements to understand Fidesz’s reforms: the importance of deeper commitments to democracy among the leadership of mainstream parties, and the pivotal role of party strategies of citizen mobilization in the consolidation of young democracies. Drawing on these insights, the paper argues for approaching democratic consolidation as an agent-led process of cultural change, emphasizing the socializing role of mainstream parties’ strategies of mobilization in the emergence of a democratic political culture. The last section concludes with methodological and empirical considerations, outlining a three-fold agenda for future research.

In recent years, a number of scholars have taken parties and partisanship as objects of normative theorizing. They posit partisanship as a fundamentally democratic practice and develop a model of what partisans can do at their best to contribute to liberal democracy.However, the standards the literature puts forth remain insufficiently specified to serve as If parties fulfil such irreplaceable functions, this also implies that their failures will have consequences for the vitality of modern democracy (Goodin 2008). While a vast literature documents the democratic performance of political parties, party scholars have been reluctant to engage with contemporary democratic theory. This has resulted in a body of work that is generally under-theorized, and which tends to overlook some of the central affective and symbolic functions that parties perform (van Biezen and Saward 2008). This paper responds to these challenges with a model of democratic partisanship amenable to empirical study. My starting point is a recent body of democratic theory that takes partisanship as its main object, and from which I derive a number of standards for democratic partisanship. For the purpose of this article, I define partisanship as the routinized practices and discourses of the supporters, members and leaders of a particular party in support of a shared conception of the public good. 2 Partisanship is democratic when these routinized practices and discourses contribute to liberal democracy, understood as a system of limited representative government that ensures both popular self-rule 2 As emphasized by White and Ypi, partisanship conceived as the "collective will of partisans" can exist without a party structure at its centre (White and Ypi 2016, 23). For the purpose of this article, I focus on those more easily identifiable communities that find an organizational expression and are thus tied together by party support, membership or leadership.Lise Herman, Forthcoming, American Political Science Review 3 and respect for minority rights. The set of specific indicators that this article develops serves to empirically evaluate the democratic merits of partisan discourse more specifically.In what follows, I will first discuss the lack of engagement of party studies with democratic theory, and how existing theories of partisanship are either insufficiently refined or insufficiently comprehensive to empirically evaluate the democratic merits of partisan discourses and practices on their basis. In the second part of this paper, I further conceptualize these theories and focus on two main characteristics that the literature ascribes to democratic forms of partisanship:cohesiveness and respect for political pluralism. Starting from these two general concepts, I derive a series of more specific indicators that can serve to evaluate the extent to which the discourses of real-world partisans meet these normative ideals. The last section of the paper illustrates how this theoretical framework can be applied in empirical studies of...

Over the last decade, the EU’s fundamental values have been under threat at the national level, in particular among several Central and Eastern European states that joined the EU since 2004. During this time, the European People’s Party (EPP) has been criticized for its unwillingness to vote for measures that would sanction the Hungarian Fidesz government, one of its members, in breach of key democratic principles since 2010. In this paper, we seek to understand how cohesive the EPP group has been on fundamental values-related votes, how the position of EPP MEPs on these issues has evolved over time, and what explains intra-EPP disagreement on whether to accommodate fundamental values violators within the EU. To address these questions, we analyse the votes of EPP MEPs across 24 resolutions on the protection of EU fundamental values between 2011 and 2019. Our findings reveal below-average EPP cohesion on these votes, and a sharp increase in the tendency of EPP MEPs to support these resolutions over time. A number of factors explain the disagreements we find. While the EPP’s desire to maintain Fidesz within its ranks is central, this explanation does not offer a comprehensive account of the group’s accommodative behaviour. In particular, we find that ideological factors as well as the strategic interests of national governments at the EU level are central to understanding the positions of EPP MEPs, as well as the evolution of these positions over time. These results further our understanding of the nature of the obstacles to EU sanctions in fundamental values abuse cases, and the role of partisanship in fuelling EU inaction especially.

This paper focuses on how electoral fairness is vulnerable to abuse by self-interested partisans-especially abuse that conforms to legally and constitutionally sanctioned procedures. This phenomenon sometimes labelled 'abusive legalism,' challenges the aspiration to design institutions that depend only on rationally self-interested actors for their endurance. Electoral fairness in particular, we argue, depends on partisans who endorse and act from a commitment to political pluralism. We identify the normative reasons that make sense of such a commitment, and consider the difficulties involved in applying this commitment to practical projects of institutional reform. In this process, we define a theoretical framework that both adds to the expanding literature on democratic partisanship and provides a basis for further empirical research on the mechanisms of democratic backsliding.

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