Dependence of optimal monitoring strategy on the application to be protected

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

Trappe

2015

Self Cite

The reliable coordination of communication channels between two organizations is becoming an increasingly important problem as we move toward cognitive radio systems that support dynamic spectrum access. The benefit of such coordination is clear in scenarios when both participants are completely benign, but such benefits can be easily negated if one of the participants operates in a manner contrary to their channel assignment. In this paper, we develop and explore a maxmin transmission protocol for a primary user (PU) in a multi-band wireless network, where the secondary user (SU) may be malicious and have an intent to cause interference. In this case, the threat that a SU may be an adversary changes the problem and places the PU in a dilemma: first, if the SU is an adversary then to decrease the probability of interference it is better for the PU to select which channels it uses from a larger set of bands (i.e. possibly even including the bands reserved for the SU); on the other hand, if the SU turns out to be law obedient, then using a larger set of bands leads to an increased chance of being interfered with. Similarly, the SU also faces a dilemma if he is malicious: if the PU thinks that the SU is law obedient, then to increase the probability of jamming, the SU should target only the bands reserved for the PU; while, if the PU thinks that the SU is malicious, then by switching to the bands reserved for the SU, the probability of interference can be significantly or even totally reduced. Using gametheoretical tools, we formally explore these dilemmas and use the resulting analysis to explore the tradeoffs between different strategies in terms of payoffs to each user and knowledge of the SU's characteristics.

Section: A Bayesian Model Of Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

One-Time Spectrum Coexistence in Dynamic Spectrum Access When the Secondary User May Be Malicious

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

Trappe

2015

Self Cite

“…We here consider two sub-scenarios: (a) the Invader's type is known: namely, it is known how the reward for the Invader is related to the width of the frequency band he uses if he is undetected, (b) the Invader's type is unknown: instead, there is only a chance that the Invader reward is related to the width in use, else it is not related. Different type of rewards can be motivated by using different type of application (say, file-download or streaming video [10]). …”

Section: B Formulation Of the Problem In The Second Step Of The Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As another example, in [14], the authors proposed a method to detect anomalous transmission by making use of radio propagation characteristics. In [10] authors investigated what impact on spectrum scanning can have information about the over-arching application that a spectrum thief might try to run.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing scanning strategies: Selecting scanning bandwidth in adversarial RF environments

8th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks

Trappe

Kung

2013

Self Cite

In this paper we investigate the problem of designing a spectrum scanning strategy to detect an intelligent Invader who wants to utilize spectrum undetected for his/her unapproved purposes. To deal with this problem we apply game-theoretical tools. We model the situation as a game between a Scanner and an Invader where the Invader faces a dilemma: the more bandwidth the Invader attempts to use leads to a larger payoff if he is not detected, but at the same time also increases the probability of being detected and thus fined. Similarly, the Scanner faces a dilemma: the wider the bandwidth scanned, the higher the probability of detecting the Invader, but at the expense of increasing the cost of building the scanning system. The equilibrium strategies are found explicitly and reveal interesting properties. In particular, we have found a discontinuous dependence of the equilibrium strategies on the network parameters, fine and the type of the Invader's award. This discontinuity on fine means that the network provider has to take into account a human factor since some threshold values of fine could be very sensible for the Invader, while in other situations simply increasing the fine has minimal deterrence impact. Also we show how different reward types for the Invader (e.g. motivated by using different type of application, say, video-streaming or downloading files) can be incorporated into scanning strategy to increase its efficiency.

“…A survey paper [6] on security games describes the research challenges for applying game theoretic methods in security systems. Among such research, for example, Sagduyu et al [7] suggested a jamming game for power-controlled medium access with dynamic traffic, a game-theoretic approach for eavesdropping and jamming in next-generation wireless networks was suggested in [8], malicious users in collaborative networks are modeled in [9], challenges in applying game theory to the domain of information warfare are discussed in [10], static and dynamic games for infrastructure security are suggested in [11], stochastic games for security in networks with interdependent nodes were investigated in [12], and bandwidth scanning strategies to detect illegal intrusion in a network are described in [13] and [14]. Also, game theory has been applied to fight jamming with jamming [15], for resource allocation in wireless networks between users [16] and channels [17] in the presence of a jammer, to ad hoc networks [18] and for node protection [19].…”

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confidence: 99%

Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies

Baykal‐Gürsoy

Poor

2016

IEEE Trans. Cybern.

Self Cite

The security community has witnessed a significant increase in the number of different types of security threats. This situation calls for the design of new techniques that can be incorporated into security protocols to meet these challenges successfully. An important tool for developing new security protocols as well as estimating their effectiveness is game theory. This game theory framework usually involves two players or agents: 1) a protector and 2) an adversary, and two patterns of agent behavior are considered: 1) selfish behavior, where each of the agents wants to maximize his payoff; and 2) leader and follower behavior, where one agent (the leader) expects that the other agent (the follower) will respond to the leader's strategy. Such an approach assumes that the agents agree on which strategy to apply in advance. In this paper, this strong assumption is relaxed. Namely, the following question is considered: what happens if it is unknown a priori what pattern of behavior the adversary is going to use, or in other words, it is not known, what game he intends to play? Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown that the protector can lose if he does not take into account the possibility that the adversary can play a game other than the one the protector has in mind. Further considered is a repeated game in which the protector can learn about the presence of an adversary, and the behavior of belief probabilities is analyzed in this setting.