Der Deutsche Bundestag

Ismayr, Wolfgang

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-92625-8

Cited by 56 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The causes of plenary debates in the Bundestag are diverse. 43 The reading of a bill is the most frequent occasion, but there are also debates on request (Aktuelle Stunden) where current affairs are discussed, debates following government declarations, debates on reports of different origin and debates for other reasons. All debates, regardless of their type, which can be connected to at least one of the policy dimensions, are included in the analysis.…”

Section: Wordscoresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Informal parlimentary party groups (PPG) standing orders and rules require MPs to report speeches, votes and proposals deviating from the party line to the PPG leadership before making them public. 53 For example, the fiercest critics of Schröder's social reform package 'Agenda 2010', Ottmar Schreiner, Florian Pronold and Andrea Nahles, did not have the floor frequently during plenary debates in the 15th German Bundestag.…”

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confidence: 98%

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Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches

Bernauer¹,

Bräuninger²

2009

German Politics

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In a broad range of research in comparative politics, political parties are conceptualised as unitary actors with consistent preferences. We depart from this sometimes accurate, at other times overly strong assumption by studying patterns of intra-party heterogeneity of preferences within parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag from 2002 -05. For this purpose, we use the Wordscores method, a form of computational text analysis, to estimate policy positions of 453 individual legislators based on plenary speeches. We then study the link between intra-party faction membership and expressed policy positions. We find that there is a limited, but consistent effect of intra-party factionalism in the German Bundestag. According to random effects ANOVA, faction membership determines about 3 per cent of the variance of positions on economic policy in the present study.

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Section: Wordscoresmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches

Bernauer¹,

Bräuninger²

2009

German Politics

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“…The much smaller comparative literature also is divided. For example in the literature on Germany, some scholars have found that legislative organization is driven by parties' collective interests, and there is no significant effect of the different electoral incentives MPs face on legislative organization (see Ismayr 1992;Nohlen 1990). In contrast, others have suggested that in Germany Single-member-district-(SMD)-based MPs consider their electoral fortunes more tied to procuring particularistic benefits for the district than do proportional representation-(PR)-based MPs (Lancaster and Patterson 1990) and that this influences the posts that politicians receive (Stratmann and Baur 2002).…”

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confidence: 99%

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006

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H ow do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixedmember electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

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“…Since the early 1960s, the Bundestag's petition system has been subject to a number of reform proposals. Recurring issues have included the competences and investigatory powers which should be assigned to the petitions committee, striking an adequate balance between res privata and res publica, establishment of a national parliamentary ombudsman, and the desirable degree of publicness in handling petitions (Banse 1973;Betz 1994;Bockhofer 1999;Ismayr 1992;Korinek 1977). The most recent wave of discussions concerning the petition system dates back to 2002, which resulted in the Bundestag's e-petition pilot scheme and other notable procedural reforms in 2005.…”

Section: E-petitions At the German Bundestag: The Users' Response Fromentioning

confidence: 99%

Broadening Participation Through E‐Petitions? An Empirical Study of Petitions to the German Parliament

Lindner

Riehm

2011

Policy & Internet

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Petitioning is a well established form of political participation in most liberal democracies, but little is known about petitioners, their socio-demographics, motivations and assessments of petitioning processes. In 2005, the German parliament introduced public e-petitions which are submitted, signed and discussed on the Internet. This article reports a 2007 survey of 571 traditional and 350 e-petitioners. The results indicate that both petitioner samples are characterised by an above average level of general political participation and Internet use. Users of the e-petition system are younger than traditional petitioners, but the group continues to be dominated by men and those with higher levels of formal education than traditional petitioners. E-petitions seem to amplify existing inequalities in participation patterns as they predominately attract highly mobilised and politically active individuals with a disproportionately high socio-economic status.

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Der Deutsche Bundestag

Cited by 56 publications

References 0 publications

Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches

Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

Broadening Participation Through E‐Petitions? An Empirical Study of Petitions to the German Parliament

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