Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility

Abstract

There is a long-standing debate about whether Descartes was a libertarian or a compatibilist about free will. 2 This debate is occasioned by some apparently contradictory claims made by Descartes. In several contexts Descartes seems to endorse a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). PAP can be understood in a number of ways, but for the purpose of this paper I'll understand it as saying, roughly, that free agents can act otherwise than they do (when acting freely). 3 Every time Descartes endorses PAP, he straightaway endorses a claim dubbed by Scott Ragland 'Clear and Distinct Determinism' (CDD). According to CDD, if an agent S has a clear and distinct perception that x is true (or good), S cannot refrain from endorsing (or pursuing) x. 4 To the extent that one emphasizes Descartes's endorsements of PAP, Descartes looks like a libertarian; to the extent that one emphasizes Descartes's endorsements of CDD, Descartes looks like a compatibilist (given, of course, his clear commitment to free will).In a letter (allegedly) 5 to Mesland (AT IV, 173 / CSMK 245) Descartes claims that in the face of a clear and distinct perception, "absolutely speaking" we are able to refrain from pursuing the good or affirming the truth perceived, but "morally speaking" we are "hardly" able to so refrain. This claim suggests that PAP and CDD should be read with two senses of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research