In this paper, I argue that the certainty about the wrongness of killing must not be considered as a universal, but as a local one. Initially, I show that there exist communities in which the wrongness of killing innocents is not a moral certainty and that this kind of case cannot be justified by arguing that such people are psychopaths. Lastly, I argue that universal certainties do not admit of exceptions: thus, the fact that some exceptional cases affect the certainty that killing innocents is wrong, leads me to conclude that it is a local certainty.1 . Wittgenstein (2001: §7; referred to as PI in the subsequent mention). 2 . PI: §23. 3 . See PI: §109. 4 . See Wittgenstein (1997: §284; referred to as OC in the subsequent mention). 5 . See OC: §196.