A Public-private partnership (PPP) is contract framework designed to carry out public works in the hope that the more advanced knowledge and financial support of private agents may be advantageous to develop better infrastructure projects that serve public needs. This relationship, which is embodied by a principal (e.g., government) and an agent (e.g., independent contractor), is inherently conflictive. Three main factors give rise to such conflict: the interests of the public and private party do not generally coincide, there is information asymmetry between them and their interaction unfolds in environments under uncertainty. Traditionally, the regulations put forth to mitigate the cost overruns caused by moral hazard, low performance levels and litigations are determined by methods which neither take into account a formal mathematical description of the interaction among participants nor the deterioration of physical components and their susceptibility to natural hazards. In this paper we propose an alternative approach that addresses these issues. We describe an agent-based model which represents the infrastructure system as an entity that is affected by the operations of three players: principal, agent and nature. They perform operations on the infrastructure, based on their own strategies and perceived payoffs, but are bound by a contract that constraint their actions. The purpose of the model is to simulate the interaction history among players and compute the resulting outcome in the form of the utility that each player receives. The model can be used within an optimization routine to determine which contractual rules maximize the utility for both players simultaneously.