Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

Li, Zhen; Kuo, Ching‐Chung

doi:10.1007/s10479-013-1331-6

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…David et al . () and Li and Kuo (, ) show that non‐constant tick‐sizes can improve the market competitiveness for single‐round auctions with single objects. In multi‐unit auctions with a standard rationing rule ( μ = 1), the competition boosting factor λ is equal to one irrespective of whether tick‐sizes are constant or not.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions

Holmberg

2017

The Economic Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractIn multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, and …nancial exchanges, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach in the literature and in practice is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This paper shows how bidding can be made more competitive if the rationing rule instead gives increasing priority to bidders with a small volume of marginal bids at clearing prices closer to the reservation price. In comparison to standard rationing, such a rule can have almost the same e¤ect on the competitiveness of bids as a doubling of the number of bidders.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions

Holmberg

2017

The Economic Journal

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“…In these contests, solvers spend irreversible efforts in order to win some prizes. 1 Such contests have triggered broad interest in the optimal design of contest schemes and prize allocation rules to boost solvers' performances (e.g., Moldovanu and Sela, 2001;Abrache et al, 2007;Li and Kuo, 2013;Bonomo et al, 2017;Koçyigit et al, 2018 ). The literature conventionally focuses on contests with a fixed set of solvers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result

Chen

Galariotis

et al. 2023

Ann Oper Res

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This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of participants in innovation contests with endogenous stochastic entry. We model innovation contests as a two-bidder all-pay auction with complete information, but in which each bidder has to incur a private cost to participate. The contest organizer observes solvers' participation decisions ex post and can commit ex ante to either fully disclosing or concealing the number of participating solvers. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of the solvers and compare the performances of the disclosure policies by four criteria. We find that full concealment dominates full disclosure in terms of expected total bid and expected winner's bid. Full concealment is dominated by full disclosure in terms of prize allocation efficiency and solvers' welfare. These findings are in sharp contrast to those under exogenous entry.

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Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction

Gonçalves

Ray

2023

Rev Econ Design

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We consider the set-up of a Japanese–English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Gonçalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177–179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.

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Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

Cited by 8 publications

References 33 publications

Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions

Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions

On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result

Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction

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