2017
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12402
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Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“… In this issue, Ausubel and Baranov () as well as Cramton and Ockenfels () deal with auctions of multiple items with multiple units that also allow for complementarities (super‐additive values). Greve and Pollitt () consider auctions of multiple independent items, while Holmberg () studies auctions of multiple identical units of one item. …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… In this issue, Ausubel and Baranov () as well as Cramton and Ockenfels () deal with auctions of multiple items with multiple units that also allow for complementarities (super‐additive values). Greve and Pollitt () consider auctions of multiple independent items, while Holmberg () studies auctions of multiple identical units of one item. …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The details of the rule does not influence our results, as long as the rationing rule is such that, whenever rationing is needed, any producer would get a significantly larger output, an increment bounded away from zero, if it reduced its offer price by any positive amount. As an example, the pro‐rata‐on‐the‐margin rule, which is a standard rationing rule in multiunit auctions (Kremer and Nyborg, ), would satisfy these properties, and so would the large class of disproportionate rationing rules that is considered by Holmberg ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%