Designing a capacitated multi-configuration logistics network under disturbances and parameter uncertainty: a real-world case of a drug supply chain

Shishebori, Davood; Babadi, Abolghasem Yousefi

doi:10.1007/s40092-017-0206-x

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…A number of research papers in CLSC have focused on competition between new and remanufactured products (Atasu et al , 2008; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001), and supply chain design (Babadi et al , 2016; Shishebori and Babadi, 2017; Shishebori and Yousefi Babadi, 2015; Yousefi-Babadi et al , 2017). Besides competition in remanufacturing and supply chain design, this paper refers to and contributes to two streams of literature: (1) product design in remanufacturing and (2) patent licensing in a CLSC.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product design and pricing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with patent protection

Xiao

Zhang

et al. 2021

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PurposeThis paper aims to propose a two-period model in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) decides the remanufacturability level of products in product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, and a third-party remanufacturer (3PR) that has been licensed by the OEM enters the remanufacturing market to compete with the OEM at the second period.Design/methodology/approachThis paper analyzes the OEM's optimal decisions of remanufacturability level in the product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, as well as the OEM's and the 3PR's optimal decisions of selling prices at the second period, under two scenarios that the remanufacturing is constrained or unconstrained by the collected quantity available at the end of the first period, by making use of game theory.FindingsThe study finds that the OEM will choose high remanufacturability in product design only when the unit cost saving of remanufacturing or unit production cost of new products exceed certain thresholds.Originality/valueThe study is the first attempt to simultaneously integrate product design and patent licensing in remanufacturing. It provides useful insights for OEM managers who face competition from 3PRs and may use their product design strategies to deter 3PRs and may protect patent of products by levying patent licensing fees from 3PRs.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product design and pricing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with patent protection

Xiao

Zhang

et al. 2021

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“…For that, it is needed to design a value-creating supply chain network which will able to resist the operation before and after the unwanted event (Izadi and Kimiagari 2014). A robust supply chain can work in spite of a few unsettling influences, as it withstands and adapts to stuns by holding its dependability when changes happen (Tang 2006;Shishebori and Babadi 2018).…”

Section: Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance indicators for supply chain resilience: review and conceptual framework

2019

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In the current competitive and dynamic market, customer demands and interests are changing continuously, and hence, risk of disruption in the supply chain is also increasing. To be successful in this scenario, supply chain of a firm should be resilient. Most of the firms realize that with a specific end goal to develop a resilient supply chain, there is a need for assessment of performance. The purpose of this paper is to discuss supply chain resilience and identify indicators which can help in increasing the performance and making a supply chain resilient. Articles published on this issue were collected and classified to draw out some meaningful information. After classification and analyses of the collected literature, seventeen performance indicators for supply chain resilience are found. A supply chain resilience framework is developed using these indicators to assist the supply chain managers to examine and withstand the disruption.

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“…The model can be formulated as a mixedinteger programming problem to consider the effect of logistic cost, transportation vehicle type and their capacity, investment budget, capacity of facility, etc. (Ghezavati and Beigi 2016;Shishebori and Babadi 2018;Rezaee et al 2017), to obtain influence of government incentive empirically in a CLSC network, because those costs make significant impact on overall CLSC performance. We consider and compare results under two incentive policies; one can analyze incentives on remanufacturing activities or the manufacturer's target on the volume of recycled products.…”

Section: Summary and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives

Saha

Nielsen

Majumder³

2019

J Ind Eng Int

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The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer's R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits. Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening level. 15 (Suppl 1):S291-S308 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40092-019-00333-z( 0123456789().,-volV) (0123456789().,-volV) Literature reviewThis study is largely concerned with governments incentive and game structure in CLSC, and the literature on priceand GL-sensitive demand. In the following paragraphs, we discuss two important topics in the literature to highlight the motivation and importance of this study. 2 www8.

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Designing a capacitated multi-configuration logistics network under disturbances and parameter uncertainty: a real-world case of a drug supply chain

Cited by 9 publications

References 74 publications

Product design and pricing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with patent protection

Product design and pricing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with patent protection

Performance indicators for supply chain resilience: review and conceptual framework

Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives

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